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Abstract
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important
in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic
competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape
industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance
properties of firms’ pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting. We
show that organizational forgetting does not simply negate learning-by-doing. Rather,
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ular, a model with both learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting can give rise
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model with learning-by-doing alone cannot.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies provide ample evidence that the marginal cost of production decreases
with cumulative experience in a variety of industrial settings (see, e.g., Wright 1936, Hirsch
1952, DeJong 1957, Alchian 1963, Levy 1965, Kilbridge 1962, Hirschmann 1964, Preston
& Keachie 1964, Baloff 1971, Dudley 1972, Zimmerman 1982, Lieberman 1984, Gruber
1992, Irwin & Klenow 1994, Jarmin 1994, Pisano 1994, Bohn 1995, Hatch & Mowery 1998,
Thompson 2001, Thornton & Thompson 2001). This fall in marginal cost is known as
learning-by-doing. More recent empirical studies also suggest that organizations can forget
the know-how gained through learning-by-doing due to labor turnover, periods of inactivity,
and failure to institutionalize tacit knowledge (see, e.g., Argote, Beckman & Epple 1990,
Darr, Argote & Epple 1995, Benkard 2000, Shafer, Nembhard & Uzumeri 2001, Thompson
2003). Organizational forgetting has been largely ignored by the theoretical literature.1
This is especially troubling because Benkard (2004) shows that organizational forgetting is
essential to explain the dynamics in the market for wide-bodied airframes in the 1970s and
1980s.
In this paper we provide a general model of dynamic competition based on the Markov-
perfect equilibrium framework of Ericson & Pakes (1995). We show how the economic
fundamentals of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting interact to determine the
structure and dynamics of an industry. Closest in spirit to our model is the Cabral & Ri-
ordan (1994) model with learning-by-doing alone. We build on Cabral & Riordan’s (1994)
seminal paper and other existing models of learning-by-doing by accounting for organiza-
tional forgetting.2 This seemingly small change has surprisingly large effects. Dynamic
competition with learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting is akin to racing down an
upward moving escalator. As long as a firm makes sales sufficiently frequently so that the
gain in know-how from learning-by-doing outstrips the loss in know-how from organizational
forgetting, it moves down its learning curve and its marginal cost decreases. However, if
sales slow down or come to a halt, then the firm slides back up its learning curve and its
marginal cost increases. This cannot happen in a model with learning-by-doing alone. Due
to this qualitative difference, adding organizational forgetting to a model of learning-by-
doing leads to a rich array of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics that the existing
literature neither imagined nor explained.
It is often said that learning-by-doing promotes market dominance because it gives a
more experienced firm the ability to profitably underprice its less experienced rival. As
1An exception is Lewis & Yildirim (2005) who study the role of organizational forgetting in the context
of a multi-period procurement auction in which a single buyer faces switching costs.
2Prior to the infinite-horizon price-setting model of Cabral & Riordan (1994), the literature has studied
learning-by-doing using finite-horizon quantity-setting models (e.g., Spence 1981, Fudenberg & Tirole 1983,
Ghemawat & Spence 1985, Ross 1986, Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1988, Cabral & Riordan 1997).
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Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1988) put it
... firm-specific learning encourages the growth of industrial concentration. To
be specific, one expects that strong learning possibilities, coupled with vigorous
competition among rivals, ensures that history matters ... in the sense that if a
given firm enjoys some initial advantages over its rivals it can, by undercutting
them, capitalise on these advantages in such a way that the advantages accu-
mulate over time, rendering rivals incapable of offering effective competition in
the long run ... (p. 247)
But if learning-by-doing can be “undone” by organizational forgetting, this raises the ques-
tion whether organizational forgetting is an antidote to market dominance for two reasons.
First, to the extent that the leader has more to forget than the follower, organizational for-
getting should work to equalize differences between firms. Second, because organizational
forgetting makes improvements in competitive position from learning-by-doing more transi-
tory, it should make firms more reluctant to invest in the acquisition of know-how through
price cuts in the first place. We reach the opposite conclusion: organizational forgetting
tends to make firms more instead of less aggressive. This aggressive pricing behavior, in
turn, puts the industry on a path towards market dominance.
In the absence of organizational forgetting, the price that a firm sets reflects two goals.
First, by winning a sale, the firm moves down its learning curve. This is the advantage-
building motive. Second, the firm prevents its rival from moving down its learning curve.
This is the advantage-defending motive. In the presence of organizational forgetting, bidi-
rectional movements through the state space are possible, and this opens up new strategic
possibilities for firms that work to enhance the advantage-building and advantage-defending
motives. By winning a sale, a firm makes itself less vulnerable to future losses from or-
ganizational forgetting, thus enhancing the advantage-building motive. It also makes its
rival more vulnerable to future losses from organizational forgetting, thus enhancing the
advantage-defending motive. Because these additional benefits are achieved by winning a
sale, organizational forgetting creates strong incentives to cut prices. It is thus a source of
aggressive pricing behavior.
While the existing literature has mainly focused on the dominance properties of firms’
pricing behavior, we find that these properties are neither necessary nor sufficient for eco-
nomically meaningful market dominance in our more general setting. We therefore go be-
yond the existing literature and directly examine the industry dynamics implied by firms’
pricing behavior. We find that organizational forgetting is a source of—and not an anti-
dote to—market dominance. If organizational forgetting is sufficiently weak, then asymme-
tries may arise but they cannot persist. If organizational forgetting is sufficiently strong,
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then asymmetries cannot arise in the first place because organizational forgetting stifles
investment in learning-by-doing altogether. By contrast, for intermediate degrees of or-
ganizational forgetting, asymmetries arise and persist. Even extreme asymmetries akin to
near-monopoly are possible. This is because organizational forgetting predisposes the leader
to defend its position aggressively against imminent and distant threats. This more than
offsets the increased vulnerability to organizational forgetting as the stock of know-how
grows and therefore makes the leadership position more secure than it would have been in
the absence of organizational forgetting.
Organizational forgetting is also a source of multiple equilibria. If the inflow of know-
how into the industry due to learning-by-doing is substantially smaller than the outflow of
know-how due to organizational forgetting, then it is virtually impossible that both firms
reach the bottom of their learning curves. Conversely, if the inflow is substantially greater
than the outflow, then it is virtually inevitable that they do. An extreme example is the
Cabral & Riordan (1994) model with learning-by-doing alone. In both cases, the primitives
of the model tie down the equilibrium. This is no longer the case if the inflow roughly
balances the outflow, setting the stage for multiple equilibria. If firms believe that they
cannot profitably coexist at the bottom of their learning curves and that instead one firm
comes to dominate the market, then both firms cut their prices in the hope of acquiring
a competitive advantage early on and maintaining it throughout. This aggressive pricing
behavior, in turn, leads to market dominance. However, if firms believe that they can
profitably coexist, then neither firm cuts its price, thereby ensuring that the anticipated
symmetric industry structure actually emerges. Consequently, in addition to the degree of
organizational forgetting, the equilibrium by itself is an important determinant of pricing
behavior and industry dynamics.
In our model multiple equilibria do not arise because of the specification of the primitives.
In fact, we are able to show that multiple equilibria arise from firms’ expectations regarding
the value of continued play. In this sense multiplicity is rooted in the dynamics of the
model. Our finding of multiplicity is important for two reasons. First, to our knowledge,
all applications of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995) framework have found a single equilibrium. It
indeed is often held that “nonuniqueness does not seem to be a problem” in this setting
(Pakes & McGuire 1994, p. 570). It is therefore striking that we obtain up to nine equilibria
for some parameterizations. Second, being able to pinpoint the driving force behind multiple
equilibria is a first step towards tackling the multiplicity problem that plagues the estimation
of dynamic stochastic games and inhibits the use of counterfactuals in policy analysis (see
Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry & Pakes (2005) and Pakes (2006) for a discussion of the issue).
In sum, learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are distinct economic forces.
Organizational forgetting, in particular, does not simply negate learning-by-doing. The
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unique role played by organizational forgetting comes about because it makes bidirectional
movements through the state space possible. As a consequence, a model with both learning-
by-doing and organizational forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, market
dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning-by-doing alone cannot.
We also make two methodological contributions. First, we point out a weakness of
the major tool for computing equilibria in the literature following Ericson & Pakes (1995).
Specifically, we prove that our dynamic stochastic game has equilibria that cannot be com-
puted by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm. Roughly speaking, in the presence of
multiple equilibria, “in between” two equilibria that can be computed by the Pakes &
McGuire (1994) algorithm, there is one equilibrium that cannot. This severely limits the
ability of the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm to provide a reasonably complete picture
of the set of solutions to the model.
Second, we propose a homotopy or path-following algorithm. The algorithm traces out
the equilibrium correspondence by varying the degree of organizational forgetting and al-
lows us to compute equilibria that cannot be computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994)
algorithm. We find that the equilibrium correspondence contains a unique path that starts
at the equilibrium of the model with learning-by-doing alone. Whenever this path bends
back on itself and then forward again, there are multiple equilibria. In addition, the equi-
librium correspondence may contain (one or more) loops that cause additional multiplicity.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to describe in detail the structure of the set of
equilibria of a dynamic stochastic game in the tradition of Ericson & Pakes (1995).
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe
the model specification and our computational strategy. Section 4 provides an overview
of the equilibrium correspondence. Section 5 analyzes industry dynamics and Section 6
characterizes the pricing behavior that drives it. Section 7 describes how organizational
forgetting can lead to multiple equilibria. Section 8 undertakes a number of robustness
checks. Section 9 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Throughout the paper we distinguish between propositions which are established through
formal proofs and results. A result either establishes a possibility through a numerical ex-
ample or summarizes a regularity through a systematic exploration of the parameter space.
2 Model
For expositional clarity we focus on the basic model of an industry with two firms and
neither entry nor exit. The general model is outlined in the Online Appendix.
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Firms and states. We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic game
of complete information played by two firms. Firm n ∈ {1, 2} is described by its state
en ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. A firm’s state indicates its cumulative experience or stock of know-how.
By making a sale, a firm can add to its stock of know-how. Following Cabral & Riordan
(1994), we take a period to be just long enough for a firm to make a sale.3 In contrast to
Cabral & Riordan (1994), however, we incorporate organizational forgetting in our model
as suggested by the empirical studies of Argote et al. (1990), Darr et al. (1995), Benkard
(2000), Shafer et al. (2001), and Thompson (2003). Accordingly, the evolution of firm n’s
stock of know-how is governed by the law of motion
e′n = en + qn − fn,
where e′n and en is firm n’s stock of know-how in the subsequent and current period,
respectively, the random variable qn ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether firm n makes a sale, and the
random variable fn ∈ {0, 1} represents organizational forgetting. If qn = 1, the firm gains
a unit of know-how through learning-by-doing, while it loses a unit of know-how through
organizational forgetting if fn = 1.
At any point in time, the industry is characterized by a vector of firms’ states e =
(e1, e2) ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2. We refer to e as the state of the industry. We use e[2] to denote the
vector (e2, e1) found by interchanging the stocks of know-how of firms 1 and 2.
Learning-by-doing. Firm n’s marginal cost of production c(en) depends on its stock of
know-how en through a learning curve
c(en) =
{
κeηn if 1 ≤ en < m,
κmη if m ≤ en ≤M,
where η = log2 ρ for a progress ratio of ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Marginal cost decreases by 100(1 − ρ)
percent as the stock of know-how doubles, so that a lower progress ratio implies a steeper
learning curve. The marginal cost of production at the top of the learning curve, c(1), is
κ > 0 and, in line with Cabral & Riordan (1994), m represents the stock of know-how at
which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve.4
3A sale may involve a single unit or a batch of units (e.g., 100 aircraft or 10,000 memory chips) that are
sold to a single buyer.
4While Cabral & Riordan (1994) formally consider the state space to be infinite (i.e., M = ∞ in our
notation), they make the additional assumption that the price that a firm charges does not depend on how
far it is beyond the bottom of its learning curve (p. 1119). This is tantamount to assuming, as we do, that
the state space is finite.
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Organizational forgetting. We let ∆(en) = Pr(fn = 1) denote the probability that firm
n loses a unit of know-how through organizational forgetting. We assume that this prob-
ability is nondecreasing in the firm’s experience level. This has several advantages. First,
experimental evidence in the management literature suggests that forgetting by individuals
is an increasing function of the current stock of learned knowledge (Bailey 1989). Second,
a direct implication of ∆ (·) being increasing is that the expected stock of know-how in the
absence of further learning is a decreasing convex function of time.5 This phenomenon,
known in the psychology literature as Jost’s second law, is consistent with experimental
evidence on forgetting by individuals (Wixted & Ebbesen 1991). Third, in the capital-stock
model employed in empirical work on organizational forgetting the amount of depreciation
is assumed to be proportional to the stock of know-how. Hence, the additional know-how
needed to counteract depreciation must increase with the stock of know-how. Our speci-
fication has this feature but, unlike the capital-stock model, is consistent with a discrete
state space.6
The specific functional form we employ is
∆(en) = 1− (1− δ)en ,
where we refer to δ ∈ [0, 1] as the forgetting rate.7 If δ > 0, then ∆(en) is increasing and
concave in en; δ = 0 corresponds to the absence of organizational forgetting, the special case
Cabral & Riordan (1994) analyzed. Other functional forms are plausible, and we explore
some of them in Section 8.
Demand. The industry draws its customers from a large pool of potential buyers. In
each period, one buyer enters the market and purchases the good from one of the two
firms.8 The utility that the buyer obtains by purchasing good n is v − pn + εn, where
pn is the price of good n, v is a deterministic component of utility, and εn is a stochastic
component that captures the idiosyncratic preference for good n of this period’s buyer. ε1
and ε2 are unobservable to firms and are assumed to be independently and identically type
1 extreme value distributed with location parameter 0 and scale parameter σ > 0. The
scale parameter governs the degree of horizontal product differentiation. As σ → 0, goods
5See the Online Appendix for a proof.
6See Benkard (2004) for an alternative approximation to the capital-stock model.
7One way to motivate this functional form is to imagine that the stock of know-how is dispersed among
a firm’s workforce. In particular, assume that en is the number of skilled workers and that organizational
forgetting is the result of labor turnover. Then, given a turnover rate of δ, ∆(en) is the probability that at
least one of the en skilled workers leaves the firm.
8Since there is a different buyer in each period, buyers are non-strategic. Lewis & Yildirim (2002, 2005)
consider models with a single buyer who optimally designs a multi-period procurement auction in order to
influence the dynamics of the industry.
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become homogeneous.
The buyer purchases the good that gives it the highest utility. Given our distributional
assumptions the probability that firm n makes a sale is given by the logit specification
Dn(p) = Pr(qn = 1) =
exp(v−pnσ )∑2
k=1 exp(
v−pk
σ )
=
1
1 + exp(pn−p−nσ )
,
where p = (p1, p2) is the vector of prices and we adopt the convention of using p−n to denote
the price charged by the other firm. Demand effectively depends on differences in prices
because we assume in line with Cabral & Riordan (1994) that the buyer always purchases
from one of the two firms in the industry. In Section 8 we include an outside good in the
specification.
State-to-state transitions. From one period to the next, a firm’s stock of know-how
moves up or down or remains constant depending on realized demand qn ∈ {0, 1} and
organizational forgetting fn ∈ {0, 1}. The transition probabilities are
Pr(e′n|en, qn) =
{
1−∆(en) if e′n = en + qn,
∆(en) if e′n = en + qn − 1,
where, at the upper and lower boundaries of the state space, we modify the transition
probabilities to be Pr(M |M, 1) = 1 and Pr(1|1, 0) = 1, respectively. Note that the firm can
increase its stock of know-how only if it makes a sale in the current period, an event that
has probability Dn(e); otherwise it runs the risk that its stock of know-how will decrease.
Bellman equation. Define Vn(e) to be the expected net present value of firm n’s cash
flows if the industry is currently in state e. The value functionVn : {1, . . . ,M}2 → [−Vˆ , Vˆ ],
where Vˆ is a sufficiently large constant, is implicitly defined by the Bellman equation
Vn(e) = max
pn
Dn(pn, p−n (e))(pn − c(en)) + β
2∑
k=1
Dk(pn, p−n(e))V nk(e), (1)
where p−n(e) is the price charged by the other firm in state e, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, and V nk(e) is the expectation of firm n’s value function conditional on the buyer
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purchasing the good from firm k ∈ {1, 2} in state e as given by
V n1(e) =
e1+1∑
e′1=e1
e2∑
e′2=e2−1
Vn(e′) Pr(e′1|e1, 1)Pr(e′2|e2, 0), (2)
V n2(e) =
e1∑
e′1=e1−1
e2+1∑
e′2=e2
Vn(e′) Pr(e′1|e1, 0)Pr(e′2|e2, 1). (3)
The policy function pn : {1, . . . ,M}2 → [−pˆ, pˆ], where pˆ is a sufficiently large constant,
specifies the price pn(e) that firm n sets in state e.9 Let hn(e, pn, p−n(e),Vn) denote the
maximand in the Bellman equation (1). Differentiating this so-called return function with
respect to pn and using the properties of logit demand we obtain the first-order condition
(FOC):
0 =
∂hn(·)
∂pn
=
1
σ
Dn(pn, p−n(e))
(
σ − (pn − c(en))− βV nn(e) + hn(·)
)
.
Differentiating hn(·) a second time yields
∂2hn(·)
∂p2n
=
1
σ
∂hn(·)
∂pn
(
2Dn(pn, p−n(e))− 1
)
− 1
σ
Dn(pn, p−n(e)).
If the FOC is satisfied, then ∂
2hn(·)
∂p2n
= − 1σDn(pn, p−n(e)) < 0. The return function hn(·) is
therefore strictly quasi-concave in pn, so that the pricing decision pn(e) is uniquely deter-
mined by the solution to the FOC (given p−n(e)).
Equilibrium. In our model, firms face identical demand and cost primitives. Asymme-
tries between firms arise endogenously as a consequence of their pricing decisions for realized
demand and organizational forgetting. Hence, we focus attention on symmetric Markov per-
fect equilibria (MPE). In a symmetric equilibrium the pricing decision taken by firm 2 in
state e is identical to the pricing decision taken by firm 1 in state e[2], i.e., p2(e) = p1(e[2]),
and similarly for the value function. It therefore suffices to determine the value and policy
functions of firm 1, and we define V (e) = V1(e) and p(e) = p1(e) for each state e. Further,
we let V k(e) = V 1k(e) denote the conditional expectation of firm 1’s value function and
Dk(e) = Dk(p(e), p(e[2])) the probability that the buyer purchases from firm k ∈ {1, 2} in
state e.
9In what follows we assume that pˆ is chosen large enough to not constrain pricing behavior.
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Given this notation, the Bellman equation and FOC can be expressed as
F 1e (V
∗,p∗) = −V ∗(e) +D∗1(e) (p∗(e)− c(e1)) + β
2∑
k=1
D∗k(e)V
∗
k(e) = 0, (4)
F 2e (V
∗,p∗) = σ − (1−D∗1(e)) (p∗(e)− c(e1))− βV ∗1(e) + β
2∑
k=1
D∗k(e)V
∗
k(e) = 0, (5)
where we use asterisks to denote an equilibrium. The collection of equations (4) and (5) for
all states e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2 can be written more compactly as
F(V∗,p∗) =

F 1(1,1) (V
∗,p∗)
F 1(2,1) (V
∗,p∗)
...
F 2(M,M) (V
∗,p∗)
 = 0, (6)
where 0 is a (2M2×1) vector of zeros. Any solution to this system of 2M2 equations in 2M2
unknownsV∗ = (V ∗(1, 1), V ∗(2, 1), . . . , V ∗(M,M)) and p∗ = (p∗(1, 1), p∗(2, 1), . . . , p∗(M,M))
is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. A slightly modified version of Proposition 2
in Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2007) establishes that such an equilibrium always exists for
our model.
Parameterization. Our focus is on how learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting
affect pricing behavior and the industry dynamics implied by that behavior. Accordingly,
we explore the full range of values for the progress ratio ρ and the forgetting rate δ. To
do so, we proceed as follows: First we specify a grid of 100 equidistant values of ρ ∈ (0, 1].
For each of them, we then use the homotopy algorithm described in Section 3 to trace the
equilibrium as δ ranges from 0 to 1. Typically this entails solving the model for a few
thousand intermediate values of δ.
Most empirical estimates of progress ratios are in the range of 0.7 to 0.95 (Dutton &
Thomas 1984). However, a very steep learning curve with ρ much less than 0.7 may also
capture a practically relevant situation. Suppose the first unit of a product is a hand-built
prototype and the second unit is a guinea pig for organizing the production line. After this
point the gains from learning-by-doing are more or less exhausted and the marginal cost of
production is close to zero.10
We note that empirical studies have found monthly rates of depreciation ranging from
10To avoid a marginal cost of close to zero, shift the cost function c(en) by τ > 0. While introducing a
component of marginal cost that is unresponsive to learning-by-doing shifts the policy function by τ , the
value function and the industry dynamics are left the same.
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4 to 25 percent of the stock of know-how (Benkard 2000, Argote et al. 1990). In the Online
Appendix we show how to map these estimates that are based on a capital-stock model
of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting into in our specification. The implied
values of the forgetting rate δ fall below 0.1.
We fix the values of the remaining parameters until Section 8 where we discuss their
influence on the equilibrium and demonstrate the robustness of our conclusions. In our
baseline parameterization, we set M = 30 and m = 15. The marginal cost at the top of
the learning curve κ is equal to 10. For a progress ratio of ρ = 0.85, this implies that the
marginal cost of production declines from a maximum value of c(1) = 10 to a minimum
value of c(15) = . . . = c(30) = 5.30. For ρ = 0.15, we have the case of a hand-built prototype
where the marginal cost of production declines very quickly from c(1) = 10 over c(2) = 1.50
and c(3) = 0.49 to c(15) = . . . = c(30) = 0.01.
Turning to demand, we set σ = 1 in our baseline parameterization. To illustrate, in the
Nash equilibrium of a static price-setting game (obtained by setting β = 0) the own-price
elasticity of demand ranges between −8.86 in state (1, 15) and −2.13 in state (15, 1) for a
progress ratio of ρ = 0.85. The cross-price elasticity of firm 1’s demand with respect to
firm 2’s price is 2.41 in state (15, 1) and 7.84 in state (1, 15). For ρ = 0.15 the own-price
elasticity ranges between −9.89 and −1.00 and the cross-price elasticity between 1.00 and
8.05. These reasonable elasticities suggest that the results reported below are not artifacts
of extreme parameterizations.
We set the discount factor to β = 11.05 . The discount factor can be thought of as
β = ζ1+r , where r > 0 is the per-period discount rate and ζ ∈ (0, 1] is the exogenous
probability that the industry survives from one period to the next. Consequently, our
baseline parameterization corresponds to a variety of scenarios that differ in the length of
a period. For example, it corresponds to a period length of one year, a yearly discount
rate of 5 percent, and certain survival. Perhaps more interesting, it also corresponds to a
period length of one month, a monthly discount rate of 1 percent (which translates into a
yearly discount rate of 12.68 percent), and a monthly survival probability of 0.96. To put
this—our focal scenario—in perspective, technology companies such as IBM and Microsoft
had costs of capital in the range of 11 to 15 percent per annum in the late 1990s. Further,
an industry with a monthly survival probability of 0.96 has an expected lifetime of 26.25
months. Thus this scenario is consistent with a pace of innovative activity that is expected
to make the current generation of products obsolete within two to three years.
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3 Computation
In this section we first describe a novel algorithm for computing equilibria that is based on
homotopy methods. Then we turn to the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm—the main
tool in the literature initiated by Ericson & Pakes (1995)—and show that it is inadequate
for characterizing the set of solutions to our model. A reader who is more interested in the
economic implications of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting may skip ahead to
Section 4.
3.1 Homotopy algorithm
Our homotopy or path-following algorithm is designed to explore the set of equilibria in a
systematic fashion. It is especially useful in models like ours that have multiple equilibria.
Starting from a single equilibrium that has already been computed for a given parameter-
ization of the model, the homotopy algorithm traces out an entire path of equilibria by
varying a parameter of interest.11
In Section 4 we show that the equilibrium is unique if organizational forgetting is either
absent (δ = 0) or certain (δ = 1). This makes the forgetting rate the natural choice for the
homotopy parameter. The object of interest is therefore the equilibrium correspondence
F−1 = {(V∗,p∗, δ)|F(V∗,p∗, δ) = 0} ,
where F(·) is the system of equations (6) that defines an equilibrium and we make explicit
that it depends on δ. Note that we hold fixed all parameters other than the forgetting
rate. The homotopy algorithm follows the path that connects the unique equilibrium at
δ = 0 with the unique equilibrium at δ = 1. Whenever this path folds back on itself, the
homotopy algorithm automatically identifies multiple equilibria.
However, the equilibrium correspondence may consist of more than the path that con-
nects δ = 0 and δ = 1. Through trial-and-error and educated guesses we have been able
to identify equilibria off this “main path.” Feeding these equilibria as initial conditions to
the homotopy algorithm shows that the equilibrium correspondence contains (one or more)
loops that are disjoint from the main path (see Section 4 for details). Unfortunately, there
is no systematic approach for obtaining an initial condition for a loop of equilibria and,
consequently, the homotopy algorithm cannot be guaranteed to find all equilibria.12 As we
11See Zangwill & Garcia (1981) for an introduction to homotopy methods, Schmedders (1998, 1999) for
an application to general equilibrium models with incomplete asset markets, and Berry & Pakes (2006) for
an application to estimating demand systems.
12Unless the system of equations that defines them happens to be polynomial. See Judd & Schmedders
(2004) for some early efforts along this line.
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show in Section 3.2, it, however, is able to find many more equilibria than the Pakes &
McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Example. An example is helpful to explain how the homotopy algorithm works. Consider
the equation F (x, δ) = 0, where
F (x, δ) = −15.289− δ
1 + δ4
+ 67.500x− 96.923x2 + 46.154x3. (7)
Equation (7) implicitly relates an endogenous variable x with an exogenous parameter δ.
The set of solutions F−1 = {(x, δ)|F (x, δ) = 0} is graphed in Figure 1. There evidently
are multiple solutions to equation (7), e.g., x = 0.610, x = 0.707, and x = 0.783 at
δ = 0.3. Finding these solutions is trivial with the graph in hand, but the graph is less than
straightforward to draw even in this very simple case. Whether one solves F (x, δ) = 0 for
x taking δ as given or for δ taking x as given, the result is a multi-valued correspondence,
not a single-valued function.
To apply the homotopy method, we introduce an auxiliary variable s that indexes each
point on the graph starting at point A for s = 0 and ending at point D for s = s¯. The
graph is then just the parametric path given by a pair of functions (x(s), δ(s)) satisfying
F (x(s), δ(s)) = 0 or, equivalently, (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1. While there are infinitely many such
pairs, there is a simple way to select a member of this family. Differentiate F (x(s), δ(s)) = 0
with respect to s to obtain
∂F (x(s), δ(s))
∂x
x′(s) +
∂F (x(s), δ(s))
∂δ
δ′(s) = 0. (8)
This differential equation in two unknowns x′(s) and δ′(s) captures the condition that is
required to remain “on path.” One possible approach for tracing out a path in F−1 is thus
to solve equation (8) for the ratio x
′(s)
δ′(s) = − ∂F (x(s),δ(s))/∂δ∂F (x(s),δ(s))/∂x that indicates the direction of
the next step along the path from s to s+ ds. This approach, however, creates difficulties
because the ratio may switch from +∞ to −∞, e.g., at point B in Figure 1. So instead of
solving for the ratio, we simply solve for each term of the ratio. This insight implies that
the graph of F−1 in Figure 1 is the solution to the system of differential equations
x′(s) =
∂F (x(s), δ(s))
∂δ
, (9)
δ′(s) = −∂F (x(s), δ(s))
∂x
. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) are the so-called basic differential equations for our example.
Their significance is that they reduce the task of tracing out the set of solutions to solving
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a system of differential equations. Given an initial condition this is can be done with a
variety of methods (see, e.g., Chapter 10 of Judd 1998). In our example, note that if δ = 0,
then F (x, δ) = 0 is easily solved for x = 0.5. This provides the initial condition (point A
in Figure 1). From there the homotopy algorithm uses the basic differential equations to
determine the next step along the path. It continues to follow—step-by-step—the path until
it reaches δ = 1 (point D). Whenever δ′(s) switches sign from negative to positive (point
B), the path is bending backward and there are multiple solutions. Conversely, whenever
the sign of δ′(s) switches back from positive to negative (point C), the path is bending
forward.13
Returning to our model of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting, let x =
(V∗,p∗) denote the 2M2 endogenous variables. Our goal is to explore the equilibrium
correspondence F−1 = {(x, δ)|F(x, δ) = 0} that depends on the exogenous parameter δ.
Proceeding as in our example, a parametric path is a set of functions (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1.
Differentiating F(x(s), δ(s)) = 0 with respect to s yields the conditions that are required
to remain on path
∂F(x(s), δ(s))
∂x
x′(s) +
∂F(x(s), δ(s))
∂δ
δ′(s) = 0, (11)
where ∂F(x(s),δ(s))∂x is the (2M
2×2M2) Jacobian, x′(s) and ∂F(x(s),δ(s))∂δ are (2M2×1) vectors,
and δ′(s) is a scalar. This system of 2M2 differential equations in 2M2+1 unknowns x′i(s),
i = 1, . . . , 2M2, and δ′(s) has a solution that obeys the basic differential equations
y′i(s) = (−1)i+1 det
((
∂F(y(s))
∂y
)
−i
)
, i = 1, . . . , 2M2 + 1, (12)
where y(s) = (x(s), δ(s)) and the notation (·)−i is used to indicate that the ith column is
removed from the (2M2 × 2M2 + 1) Jacobian ∂F(y(s))∂y . Note that equation (12) reduces to
equations (9) and (10) if x is a scalar instead of a vector. For the general case, a proof that
the basic differential equations satisfy the conditions in equation (11) that are required to
remain on path can be found in Garcia & Zangwill (1979) and on pp. 27–28 of Zangwill &
Garcia (1981).
A closer inspection of the basic differential equations (12) points to a potential difficulty
with the homotopy algorithm. If the Jacobian ∂F(y(s))∂y has less than full rank, then the
determinants of all its submatrices are zero. Thus, y′i(s) = 0, i = 1, . . . , 2M + 1, and the
homotopy algorithm stalls. A central condition in the mathematical literature on homotopy
13The orientation of the path taken by the homotopy algorithm is arbitrary. Reversing the signs of
the basic differential equations implies, perhaps more intuitively, that δ′(s) switches sign from positive to
negative at point B.
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methods is that the Jacobian has full rank at all points. If so, the homotopy is called regular
and the algorithm is sure to trace out a path. Moreover, regularity rules out both isolated
equilibria and continua of equilibria. While we have been unable to prove that our homotopy
is regular, we have been able to verify that the Jacobian always had full rank at all points
along all paths taken by our homotopy algorithm.14
3.2 Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm
The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm or some other means for solving a system of non-
linear equations (see, e.g., Judd 1998) is needed in order to compute a starting point for our
homotopy algorithm. The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm is the main tool in the liter-
ature initiated by Ericson & Pakes (1995). It is intuitively appealing because it combines
value function iteration as familiar from dynamic programming with best reply dynamics
(akin to Cournot adjustment) as familiar from static games.
Recall that V2(e) = V1(e[2]) and p2(e) = p1(e[2]) for each state e in a symmetric equi-
librium and it therefore suffices to determine V and p, the value and policy functions of
firm 1. The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm is iterative. An iteration cycles through the
states in some predetermined order, successively updating V and p as it progresses from
one iteration to the next.
The strategic situation faced by firms in setting prices in state e is similar to a static
game if the value of continued play is taken as given. The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm
computes the best reply of firm 1 against p(e[2]) in this game. The best reply serves to update
the value and policy functions of firm 1 in state e. More formally, let h1(e, p1, p(e[2]),V)
be the maximand in the Bellman equation (1) after symmetry is imposed. The best reply
of firm 1 against p(e[2]) in state e is given by
G2e(V,p) = argmaxp1
h1(e, p1, p(e[2]),V) (13)
and the value associated with it is
G1e(V,p) = maxp1
h1(e, p1, p(e[2]),V). (14)
14Our programs use Hompack (Watson, Billups & Morgan 1987, Watson, Sosonkina, Melville & Morgan
1997) written in Fortran 90 and are available from the authors upon request.
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Write the collection of equations (13) and (14) for all states e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2 as
G(V,p) =

G1(1,1)(V,p)
G1(2,1)(V,p)
...
G2(M,M)(V,p)
 . (15)
Given an initial guess x0 = (V0,p0), the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm executes the
iteration
xk+1 = G(xk), k = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
The algorithm aims to compute a fixed point x = G(x) by continuing to iterate until
the changes in the value and policy functions of firm 1 are deemed small (or a failure to
converge is diagnosed). Any fixed point x = (V∗,p∗) of G is a symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies to our game.
Unlike our homotopy algorithm, the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm does not lend
itself to computing multiple equilibria. To identify more than one equilibrium (for a given
parameterization of the model), the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm must be restarted
from different initial guesses. But different initial guesses may or may not lead to different
equilibria. This, however, still understates the severity of the problem here: When there
are multiple equilibria, the trial-and-error approach is sure to miss a substantial fraction of
them even if an arbitrary number of initial guesses are tried. That is, our dynamic stochastic
game has equilibria that cannot computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Recall that the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm continues to iterate until it reaches
a fixed point x = G (x). A necessary condition for it to converge is that the fixed point
is locally stable. Specifically, consider the (2M2 × 2M2) Jacobian ∂G(x)∂x at the fixed point
and let ρ
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)
be its spectral radius. The fixed point is locally stable under the Pakes
& McGuire (1994) algorithm if ρ
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)
< 1, i.e., if all eigenvalues are within the complex
unit circle. Given local stability, the algorithm converges provided that the initial guess is
close (perhaps very close) to the fixed point. Conversely, the fixed point is unstable and
cannot be computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm if ρ
(
∂G(x)
∂x
)
≥ 1.
In the remainder of this section we consider a parametric path (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1 in the
equilibrium correspondence, such as the path taken by our homotopy algorithm. Along this
path we ask whether the equilibrium x(s) is locally stable or unstable under the Pakes &
McGuire (1994) algorithm when the forgetting rate is set to δ(s). Proposition 1 identifies a
subset of equilibria that the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm is sure to miss.
Proposition 1 Let (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1. (i) If δ′(s) ≤ 0, then ρ
(
∂G(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
)
≥ 1. (ii)
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Moreover, the equilibrium x(s) remains unstable even if either dampening or extrapolation
is applied to the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 establishes that no equilibrium on the part of the equilibrium
correspondence where δ′(s) ≤ 0 can be computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Whenever δ′(s) switches sign from positive to negative, the path that connects the unique
equilibrium at δ = 0 with the unique equilibrium at δ = 1 bends backward and there are
multiple equilibria. Conversely, whenever the sign of δ′(s) switches back from negative to
positive, the path bends forward. Hence, holding fixed the forgetting rate, in between two
equilibria with δ′(s) > 0, there is one equilibrium with δ′(s) ≤ 0 that cannot be computed
by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm. Similarly, a loop is necessarily composed of
equilibria with δ′(s) > 0 and equilibria with δ′(s) ≤ 0. The latter cannot be computed by
the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Dampening and extrapolation are often applied to the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algo-
rithm in the hope of improving its likelihood or speed of convergence. The iteration
xk+1 = ωG(xk) + (1− ω)xk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
is said to be dampened if ω ∈ (0, 1) and extrapolated if ω ∈ (1,∞). Part (ii) of Proposition
1 establishes the futility of these attempts.15
The ability of the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm to provide a reasonably complete
picture of the set of solutions to the model is limited beyond the scope of Proposition 1. As
our computations indicate, some equilibria on the part of the equilibrium correspondence
where δ′(s) > 0 also cannot be computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm:
Result 1 Let (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1. If δ′(s) > 0, then we may have ρ
(
∂G(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
)
≥ 1.
In the Online Appendix we provide a graphic illustration of Proposition 1 and Result 1.
As is well-known, not all Nash equilibria of static games are stable under best reply
dynamics (see, e.g., Fudenberg & Tirole 1991).16 Since the Pakes & McGuire (1994) al-
gorithm incorporates best reply dynamics, it is reasonable to expect that this limits its
usefulness. In the Online Appendix we argue that this is not the case. More precisely, we
show that, holding fixed the value of continued play, the best reply dynamics are contrac-
tive and therefore converge to a unique fixed point irrespective of the initial guess. The
value function iteration also is contractive holding fixed the policy function. Hence, each of
15Dampening and extrapolation may, of course, still be helpful in computing equilibria with δ′(s) > 0.
16More generally, in static games, Nash equilibria of degree −1 are unstable under any Nash dynamics,
i.e., dynamics with rest points that coincide with Nash equilibria, including replicator and smooth fictitious
play dynamics (Demichelis & Germano 2002).
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the two building blocks of the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm “works.” What makes
it impossible to obtain a large fraction of equilibria is the combination of value function
iteration with best reply dynamics.
The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm is also known as a pre-Gauss-Jacobi method.
The subsequent literature has sometimes instead used a pre-Gauss-Seidel method (see, e.g.,
Benkard 2004, Doraszelski & Judd 2004). Whereas a Gauss-Jacobi method replaces the old
guesses for the value and policy functions with the new guesses at the end of an iteration
after all states have been visited, a Gauss-Seidel method updates after each state. This has
the advantage that “information” is used as soon as it becomes available (see Chaps. 3 and
5 of Judd (1998) for an extensive discussion of Gaussian methods). While we have been
unable to prove that Proposition 1 carries over to this alternative algorithm, we note that
the Stein-Rosenberg theorem asserts, at least for certain systems of linear equations, that if
the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm fails to converge then so does the Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see
Proposition 6.9 in Section 2.6 of Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis 1997).
4 Equilibrium correspondence
This section provides an overview of the equilibrium correspondence. Section 5 analyzes
industry dynamics and Section 6 characterizes the pricing behavior that drives it. Section
7 describes how organizational forgetting can lead to multiple equilibria.
In the absence of organizational forgetting, Cabral & Riordan (1994) show that the
equilibrium is unique. The following proposition generalizes their result:
Proposition 2 If organizational forgetting is either absent (δ = 0) or certain (δ = 1), then
there is a unique equilibrium.
Note that Proposition 2 pertains to both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.17 In what
follows, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
The cases of δ = 0 and δ = 1 are special in that they ensure that movements through the
state space are unidirectional. Specifically, when δ = 0, a firm can never move “backward”
to a lower state, and when δ = 1, it can never move “forward” to a higher state. In contrast,
when δ ∈ (0, 1), a firm can move in either direction. Our computations show that this has
a substantive impact on the set of equilibria:
Result 2 If organizational forgetting is neither absent (δ = 0) nor certain (δ = 1), then
there may be multiple equilibria.
17Recall that in a symmetric equilibrium the pricing decision taken by firm 2 in state e is identical to the
pricing decision taken by firm 1 in state e[2], i.e., p2(e) = p1(e
[2]), and similarly for the value function. In
an asymmetric equilibrium this is not necessarily the case.
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Figure 2 illustrates the extent of multiplicity. It shows the number of equilibria for each
combination of forgetting rate δ and progress ratio ρ. Darker shades indicate more equilibria.
As can be seen, we have found up to nine equilibria for some values of δ and ρ. Multiplicity is
especially pervasive for forgetting rates δ in the empirically relevant range below 0.1; indeed,
we always obtained a unique equilibrium for sufficiently large forgetting rates (δ ≥ 0.15).
In dynamic stochastic games with finite actions, Herings & Peeters (2004) have shown
that generically the number of Markov perfect equilibria is odd. While they consider both
symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, in a two-player game with symmetric primitives such
as ours, asymmetric equilibria occur in pairs. Hence, their result immediately implies that
generically the number of symmetric equilibria is odd in games with finite actions. Figure
2 suggests that this carries over to our setting with continuous actions.
We next take a closer look at the set of equilibria. Let
F−1 = {(V∗,p∗, δ)|F(V∗,p∗, δ) = 0} ,
be the equilibrium correspondence, where F(·) is the system of equations (6) that defines
an equilibrium. Our homotopy algorithm traces out an entire path of equilibria by varying
the forgetting rate (as explained in Section 3.1). We thus make explicit in our notation
that the system of equations (6) depends on δ but, at the most basic level of the analysis,
hold fixed all parameters other than δ. To extend the analysis we then vary the remaining
parameters. For the progress ratio, in particular, we explore a grid of 100 equidistant values
of ρ ∈ (0, 1]. We do not index F−1 by the remaining parameters, however, for notational
simplicity.
We have the following result:
Result 3 The equilibrium correspondence F−1 contains a unique path that connects the
equilibrium at δ = 0 with the equilibrium at δ = 1. In addition, F−1 may contain (one or
more) loops that are disjoint from the above path and from each other.
Figure 3 illustrates Result 3. An equilibrium is defined in terms of a value and a policy
function and is thus an element of a high-dimensional space. To succinctly describe it, we
proceed in two steps.
First, we use the policy function to construct the probability distribution over next
period’s state e′ given this period’s state e, i.e., the transition matrix that characterizes
the Markov process of industry dynamics. This allows us to use stochastic process theory
to analyze the Markov process of industry dynamics rather than rely on simulation. We
compute the transient distribution over states in period t, µt(·), starting from state (1, 1).
This tells us how likely each possible industry structure is in period t, given that both firms
began the game at the top of their learning curves. In addition, we compute the limiting
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(or ergodic) distribution over states, µ∞(·).18 The transient distribution captures short-run
dynamics and the limiting distribution captures long-run (or steady-state) dynamics.
Second, we use the transient distribution over states in period t, µt(·), to compute the
expected Herfindahl index
Ht =
∑
e
(
D∗1(e)
2 +D∗2(e)
2
)
µt(e).
The time path of the expected Herfindahl index summarizes the implications of learning-by-
doing and organizational forgetting for the dynamics of the industry. To the extent that the
industry evolves asymmetrically, the expected Herfindahl index exceeds 0.5. The maximum
expected Herfindahl index
H∧ = max
t∈{1,...,100}
Ht
is therefore a summary measure of short-run industry concentration. In addition, we use
the limiting distribution over states, µ∞(·), to compute the limiting expected Herfindahl
index H∞, a summary measure of long-run industry concentration. If H∞ > 0.5, then an
asymmetric industry structure persists.
We visualize the equilibrium correspondence F−1 for a variety of progress ratios by
plotting the maximum expected Herfindahl index H∧ (dashed line) and the limiting ex-
pected Herfindahl index H∞ (solid line). As can be seen, there are multiple equilib-
ria whenever the path that connects the equilibrium at δ = 0 with the equilibrium at
δ = 1 folds back on itself. Moreover, the equilibrium correspondence contains one loop for
ρ ∈ {0.75, 0.65, 0.55, 0.15, 0.05} and two loops for ρ ∈ {0.95, 0.85, 0.35}, thus adding further
equilibria.
Figure 3 is not necessarily a complete picture of the set of solutions to our model. As
discussed in Section 3.1, no algorithm is guaranteed to find all equilibria, and our homotopy
algorithm is no exception. We do find all equilibria along the path that connects the
equilibrium at δ = 0 with the equilibrium at δ = 1, and we have been successful in finding a
number of loops. But other loops may exist because, in order to trace out a loop, we must
somehow compute at least one equilibrium on the loop, and doing so is problematic.
Types of equilibria. Despite the multiplicity, the equilibria of our game exhibit four
typical patterns. One should recognize that these patterns, helpful as they are in under-
18Let P be the M2 ×M2 transition matrix. The transient distribution in period t is given by µt = µ0Pt,
where µ0 is the 1×M2 initial distribution and Pt the tth matrix power of P. If δ ∈ (0, 1), then the Markov
process is irreducible because logit demand implies that the probability moving forward is always nonzero.
That is, all its states belong to a single closed communicating class and the 1 ×M2 limiting distribution
µ∞ solves the system of linear equations µ∞ = µ∞P. If δ = 0 (δ = 1), then there is also a single closed
communicating class, but its sole member is state (M,M) ((1, 1)).
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standing the range of behaviors that can occur, lie on a continuum and thus morph into
each other as we change the parameter values.
Figure 4 exemplifies the policy functions of the typical equilibria.19 The parameter
values are ρ = 0.85 and δ ∈ {0, 0.0275, 0.08} and represent the median progress ratio across
a wide array of empirical studies combined with the cases of no, low, and high organizational
forgetting. The graph in the upper left panel of Figure 4 (ρ = 0.85 and δ = 0) is typical for
what we call a flat equilibrium without well. The policy function is very even over the entire
state space. In particular, the price that a firm charges in equilibrium is fairly insensitive to
its rival’s stock of know-how. In a flat equilibrium with well, the policy function continues
to be very even over most of the state space. However, price competition is intense in a
neighborhood of state (1, 1), which manifests itself as a “well” in the policy function (see
the upper right panel of Figure 4 for the case of ρ = 0.85 and δ = 0.0275). The graph in the
lower left panel of Figure 4 exemplifies a trenchy equilibrium. The parameter values are the
same (ρ = 0.85 and δ = 0.0275), thereby providing an instance of multiplicity. The policy
function is more uneven and exhibits a “trench” along the diagonal of the state space. This
trench extends from state (1, 1) beyond the bottom of the learning curve in state (m,m) all
the way to state (M,M). Hence, in a trenchy equilibrium, price competition between firms
with similar stocks of know-how is extremely intense, but price competition abates once
firms become asymmetric. Finally, in an extra-trenchy equilibrium, the policy function not
only has a diagonal trench, but it also has a trench parallel to the edge of the state space.
In an extra-trenchy equilibrium, price competition between symmetric firms is extremely
intense. Furthermore, due to the sideways trench, there are also parts of the state space
where the leader competes aggressively with the follower (see the lower right panel of Figure
4 for the case of ρ = 0.85 and δ = 0.08).
Sunspots. For a progress ratio of ρ = 1 the marginal cost of production is constant at
c(1) = . . . = c(M) = κ, and there are no gains from learning-by-doing. It clearly is an
equilibrium for firms to disregard their stocks of know-how and set the same prices as in the
Nash equilibrium of a static price-setting game (obtained by setting β = 0). Since firms’
marginal costs are constant, so are the static Nash equilibrium prices. Thus, we have an
extreme example of a flat equilibrium with p∗(e) = κ + 2σ = 12 and V ∗(e) = σ1−β = 21
for all states e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2. As Figure 2 shows, however, there are other equilibria for
a range of forgetting rates δ below 0.1. Since the state of the industry has no bearing on
primitives in case of ρ = 1, we refer to these equilibria as sunspots, but we note that they
persist for ρ ≈ 1.
In a sunspot, firms use the state to keep track of their sales. That is, the state serves
19The corresponding value functions can be found in the Online Appendix.
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merely as a coordination device. One of the sunspots is a trenchy equilibrium while the other
one is, depending on the value of the forgetting rate, either a flat or a trenchy equilibrium.
In the trenchy equilibrium the industry evolves towards an asymmetric structure where the
leader charges a lower price than the follower and enjoys a higher probability of making a
sale. Consequently, the net present value of cash flows to the leader exceeds that to the
follower. The value in state (1, 1), however, is lower than in the static Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
V ∗(1, 1) < 21.20 This indicates that value is destroyed as firms fight for dominance. More
generally, the existence of sunspots suggests that the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium
is richer than one may have thought.
In sum, accounting for organizational forgetting in a model of learning-by-doing leads
to multiple equilibria and a rich array of pricing behaviors. In the following section, we
explore what this entails for industry dynamics.
5 Industry dynamics
Recall that the transient distribution over states in period t, µt(·), starting from state
(1, 1), captures short-run dynamics and the limiting distribution, µ∞(·), captures long-run
dynamics. Figures 5 and 6 display the transient distribution in period 8 and 32, respectively,
and Figure 7 displays the limiting distribution for our four typical cases.21 In the flat
equilibrium without well (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0, see upper left panels), the transient and limiting
distributions are unimodal. The most likely industry structure is symmetric. For example,
the modal state is (5, 5) in period 8, (9, 9) in period 16, (17, 17) in period 32, and (30, 30)
in period 64. Turning from the short run to the long run, the industry is most likely to
remain in state (30, 30) because, in the absence of organizational forgetting, both firms
must eventually reach the bottom of their learning curves. In short, the industry starts
symmetric and stays symmetric.
By contrast, in the flat equilibrium with well (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.0275, see upper right
panels) the transient distributions are first bimodal and then unimodal as is the limiting
distribution. The modal states are (1, 8) and (8, 1) in period 8, (4, 11) and (11, 4) in period
16, (9, 14) and (14, 9) in period 32, but the modal state is (17, 17) in period 64 and the
modal states of the limiting distribution are (24, 25) and (25, 24). Thus, as times passes,
firms compete on equal footing. In sum, the industry evolves first towards an asymmetric
20For a forgetting rate of δ = 0.0275, for example, we have V ∗(28, 21) = 25.43 and p∗(28, 21) = 12.33 for
the leader, V ∗(21, 28) = 22.39 and p∗(21, 28) = 12.51 for the follower, and V ∗(1, 1) = 19.36. For δ = 0.08
we have V ∗(12, 6) = 23.41 and p∗(12, 6) = 11.96 for the leader, V ∗(6, 12) = 18.77 and p∗(6, 12) = 12.45 for
the follower, and V ∗(1, 1) = 15.94.
21To avoid clutter, we do not graph states that have probability of less than 10−4.
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structure and then towards a symmetric structure. As we discuss in detail in the follow-
ing section, the reason is that the well serves to build, but not to defend, a competitive
advantage.
While the modes of the transient distributions are more separated and pronounced in the
trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.0275, see lower left panels) than in the flat equilibrium
with well, the dynamics of the industry are similar at first. Unlike in the flat equilibrium
with well, however, the industry continues to evolve towards an asymmetric structure.
The modal states are (14, 21) and (21, 14) in period 64 and the modal states of the limiting
distribution are (21, 28) and (21, 28). Despite cost parity, however, the leader is more secure
against future losses from organizational forgetting than the follower. Asymmetries persist
as time passes because the diagonal trench serves to build and to defend a competitive
advantage.
In the extra-trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.08, see lower right panels), one firm
never makes it down from the top of its learning curve due to the sideways trench. The
transient and limiting distributions are bimodal, and the most likely industry structure is
extremely asymmetric. The modal states are (1, 7) and (7, 1) in period 8, (1, 10) and (10, 1)
in period 16, (1, 15) and (15, 1) in period 32, and (1, 19) and (19, 1) in period 64. The
modal states of the limiting distribution are (1, 26) and (26, 1). In short, one firm acquires
a competitive advantage early on and maintains it with an iron hand.
Returning to Figure 3, our summary measures of industry concentration, the maximum
expected Herfindahl index H∧ (dashed line) and the limiting expected Herfindahl indexH∞
(solid line), illustrate the fundamental economics of organizational forgetting. If organiza-
tional forgetting is sufficiently weak (δ ≈ 0), then asymmetries may arise but they cannot
persist, i.e., H∧ ≥ 0.5 and H∞ ≈ 0.5. Moreover, if asymmetries arise in the short run, they
are modest. If organizational forgetting is sufficiently strong (δ ≈ 1), then asymmetries
cannot arise in the first place, i.e., H∧ ≈ H∞ ≈ 0.5. The reason is that organizational
forgetting stifles investment in learning-by-doing altogether. By contrast, for intermediate
degrees of organizational forgetting, asymmetries arise and persist. The asymmetry can
be so pronounced that the leader is virtually a monopolist. This is because organizational
forgetting predisposes the leader to defend its position aggressively. This more than offsets
the increased vulnerability to organizational forgetting as the stock of know-how grows and
therefore makes the leadership position more secure than it would have been in the absence
of organizational forgetting.22
To summarize, contrary to what one might expect, organizational forgetting does not
negate learning-by-doing. Rather, as can be seen in Figure 3, over a range of progress
22Since the Markov process is irreducible if δ ∈ (0, 1), it is inevitable that the follower eventually overtakes
the leader. However, as a practical matter, the expected time to a role reversal is so large that this possibility
may be disregarded.
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ratios ρ above 0.6 and forgetting rates δ below 0.1, learning-by-doing and organizational
forgetting reinforce each other. Starting from the absence of both learning-by-doing (ρ = 1)
and organizational forgetting (δ = 0), a steeper learning curve, i.e., a lower progress ratio,
tends to lead to a more asymmetric industry structure just as a higher forgetting rate does.
In the following section we analyze in more detail the pricing behavior that drives industry
dynamics.
6 Pricing behavior
Re-writing equation (5) shows that firm 1’s price in state e satisfies
p∗(e) = c∗(e) +
σ
1−D∗1(e)
, (16)
where the virtual marginal cost
c∗(e) = c(e1)− βφ∗(e)
equals the actual marginal cost c(e1) minus the discounted prize βφ∗(e) from winning the
current period’s sale. The prize, to be determined in equilibrium, is given by
φ∗(e) = V ∗1(e)− V ∗2(e)
and has two components. First, by winning a sale, firm 1 may move further down its a
learning curve. We call this the advantage-building motive. Second, firm 1 may prevent
firm 2 from moving further down its learning curve. We call this the advantage-defending
motive. Winning the sale in expectation is worth V ∗1(e) to firm 1 and losing it is worth
V
∗
2(e). Pricing behavior thus hinges on the difference between these values of continued
play.
The prize φ∗(e) is the wedge that causes dynamic pricing behavior to differ from static
pricing behavior. To see this, recall that the FOC of a static price-setting game can be
written as
p†(e) = c(e1) +
σ
1−D†(e) , (17)
where D†k(e) = Dk(p
†(e), p†(e[2])) denotes the probability that, in the static Nash equilib-
rium, the buyer purchases from firm k ∈ {1, 2} in state e. Clearly, equation (16) reduces
to equation (17) if either the firm is myopic (β = 0) or its prize is zero (φ∗(e) = 0). The
difference in firms’ pricing incentives depends on the difference in their virtual marginal
costs. This difference, in turn, depends on the difference in their actual marginal costs and
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the difference in their prizes.
6.1 Price bounds
Comparing equation (16) with equation (17) shows that equilibrium prices p∗(e) and p∗(e[2])
coincide with the prices that obtain in a static Nash equilibrium with costs set to equal
virtual marginal costs c∗(e) and c∗(e[2]). Since in the static Nash equilibrium prices are
increasing in either firm’s cost (Vives 1999, p. 35) it follows that, as long as both firms’
prizes are nonnegative, equilibrium prices are bounded above by static Nash equilibrium
prices with costs set to equal actual marginal costs c(e1) and c(e2). More formally, if
φ∗(e) ≥ 0 and φ∗(e[2]) ≥ 0, then p∗(e) ≤ p†(e) and p∗(e[2]) ≤ p†(e[2]).
A sufficient condition for φ∗(e) ≥ 0 for each state e is that the value function V ∗(e1, e2)
is nondecreasing in e1 and nonincreasing in e2. Intuitively, it should not hurt firm 1 if
it moves down its learning curve and it should not benefit firm 1 if firm 2 moves down
its learning curve. This intuition is valid in the absence of organizational forgetting, and
equilibrium prices are indeed bounded above by static Nash equilibrium prices:
Result 4 If organizational forgetting is absent (δ = 0), then we have p∗(e) ≤ p†(e) for all
e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2.
Result 4 highlights the fundamental economics of learning-by-doing: as long as improve-
ments in competitive position are valuable, firms use price cuts as investments to achieve
them.
The following proposition complements Result 4 by providing a lower bound on equilib-
rium prices:
Proposition 3 If organizational forgetting is absent (δ = 0), then we have (i) p∗(e) =
p†(e) = p†(m,m) > c(m) for all e ∈ {m, . . . ,M}2 and (ii) p∗(e) > c(m) for all e1 ∈
{m, . . . ,M} and e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
An immediate implication of part (i) of Proposition 3 is that diagonal trenches (and thus
trenchy and extra-trenchy equilibria) cannot arise in the absence of organizational forget-
ting. In this case, prices are flat once both firms reach the bottom of their learning curves.
To see this, note that given δ = 0 the prize reduces to φ∗(e) = V ∗(e1+1, e2)−V ∗(e1, e2+1).
But once both firms reach the bottom of their learning curves, no further improvements in
competitive position are possible. Hence, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3, we have
V ∗(e) = V ∗(e′) for all e, e′ ∈ {m, . . . ,M}2, so that the advantage-building and advantage-
defending motives disappear. Consequently, equilibrium prices coincide with prices in the
static Nash equilibrium which, in turn, are set above cost.
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If the leader but not the follower has reached the bottom of its learning curve, then the
leader no longer has an advantage-building motive but he continues to have an advantage-
defending motive. This raises the possibility that the leader uses price cuts to delay the
follower’s progress in moving down its learning curve. However, part (ii) of Proposition 3
shows that there is a limit to how aggressively the leader will defend its advantage: below-
cost-pricing is never optimal in the absence of organizational forgetting.
In the presence of organizational forgetting pricing behavior can become much more
intricate. To begin with, the intuition that the value function V ∗(e1, e2) is nondecreasing
in e1 and nonincreasing in e2 is not always valid:
Result 5 If organizational forgetting is present (δ > 0), then we may have p∗(e) > p†(e)
for some e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2.
Figure 8 illustrates Result 5 by plotting the share of equilibria that violate the upper bound
on equilibrium prices in Result 4.23 Darker shades indicate higher shares. As can be seen,
Result 4 continues to hold if organizational forgetting is very weak (δ ≈ 0) and possibly also
if learning-by-doing is very weak (ρ ≈ 1). Apart from these extremes (and a region around
δ = 0.25 and ρ = 0.45), at least some, if not all, equilibria entail at least one state where
equilibrium prices exceed static Nash equilibrium prices.
At first glance, Result 5 suggests that organizational forgetting makes firms less aggres-
sive. This seems intuitive: After all, why invest in improvements in competitive position
when they are transitory? Surprisingly, however, it turns out that organizational forgetting
is a source of aggressive pricing behavior:
Result 6 If organizational forgetting is present (δ > 0), then we may have (i) p∗(e) <
p†(e) for some e ∈ {m, . . . ,M}2 or (ii) p∗(e) ≤ c(m) for some e1 ∈ {m, . . . ,M} and
e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Figure 9 depicts the share of equilibria that violate the lower bound on equilibrium prices in
Proposition 3. As can be seen, unless organizational forgetting or learning-by-doing is very
weak (δ ≈ 0), at least some, if not all, equilibria fail to obey Proposition 3. That is, the
leader may be more aggressive in defending its advantage in the presence of organizational
forgetting than in its absence. The most dramatic expression of this aggressive pricing
behavior are the wells and trenches in the policy function.
23To take into account the limited precision of our computations, we take the upper bound in Result 4 to
be violated if p∗(e) > p†(e) + ² for some e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2, where ² is positive but small. Specifically, we set
² = 10−2, so that if prices are measured in dollars, then the upper bound must be violated by more than a
cent. Given that the homotopy algorithm solves the system of equations up to a maximum absolute error
of about 10−12, Figure 8 therefore almost certainly understates the extent of violations.
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modal leader follower
period state cost prize price prob. cost prize price prob.
0 (1,1) 10.00 6.85 5.48 0.500 10.00 6.85 5.48 0.500
8 (8,1) 6.14 3.95 7.68 0.811 10.00 2.20 9.14 0.189
16 (11,4) 5.70 1.16 7.20 0.616 7.22 1.23 7.68 0.384
32 (14,9) 5.39 0.36 7.16 0.527 5.97 0.64 7.27 0.473
64 (17,17) 5.30 -0.01 7.31 0.500 5.30 -0.01 7.31 0.500
∞ (25,24) 5.30 -0.01 7.30 0.500 5.30 -0.00 7.30 0.500
Table 1: Cost, prize, price, and probability of making a sale. Flat equilibrium with well
(ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.0275).
6.2 Wells and trenches
In equilibrium the price set by a firm is a best reply to the price set by its rival in each
possible state of the world. One might wonder, though, whether actual firms placed in
the environment we have modeled behave in such a manner. Benkard’s (2004) analysis of
the commercial-aircraft market provides a hint that they might. Lockheed sold the L-1011
aircraft at a price below its average variable cost for much of its 14-year lifespan. Given
the nontrivial estimates of the forgetting rate in Benkard (2000), Lockheed’s actions are
consistent with the pricing behavior of a firm in the midst of a well or a trench. This
section provides intuition for wells and trenches in order to explore whether the pricing
behavior we have characterized is economically plausible and empirically relevant.
Wells. A well, as seen in the upper right panel of Figure 4, is a preemption battle that
is fought by firms at the top of their learning curves. A well serves to build a competitive
advantage as both firms use price cuts in the hope of being the first to move down the
learning curve. Once one firm has moved ahead of the other, both the leader and the
follower raise their price. The follower, in fact, surrenders by setting a much higher price
than the leader. Yet, once the follower starts to move down its learning curve, the leader
makes no attempt to defend its position. The competitive advantage is thus of a transitory
nature.
A well arises when the first sale has profound consequences for the evolution of the
industry. Table 1 provides details on firms’ competitive positions at various points in time
for our leading example of a flat equilibrium with well (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.0275).24 Being the
first to move down the learning curve, the leader has a lower cost and a higher prize and
therefore charges a lower price and enjoys a higher probability of making a sale than the
24In the remainder of this section we assume, without loss of generality, that firm 1 is the leader and firm
2 the follower.
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leader follower
state cost prize price prob. cost prize price prob.
(21, 21) 5.30 2.14 5.26 0.50 5.30 2.14 5.26 0.50
(21, 20) 5.30 3.53 5.57 0.72 5.30 0.14 6.54 0.28
(22, 20) 5.30 3.22 6.44 0.76 5.30 -1.04 7.60 0.24
(20, 20) 5.30 2.16 5.24 0.50 5.30 2.16 5.24 0.50
Table 2: Cost, prize, price, and probability of making a sale. Trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85,
δ = 0.0275).
follower in the modal state (8, 1) in period 8. As time passes and the follower moves down
its learning curve, the competitive advantage of the leader begins to erode (see the modal
state (11, 4) in period 16) and eventually vanishes completely (see the modal state (17, 17)
in period 64). This erosion of the competitive advantage of the leader is reflected in the
prize: While the leader’s prize in state (8, 1) is higher than the follower’s (3.95 vs. 2.20),
in state (11, 4) the leader’s prize is lower than the follower’s (1.16 vs. 1.23). Although the
competitive advantage is transitory, it is surely worth having: The prize in state (1, 1) is
6.85 and justifies charging a price of 5.48 that is well below the marginal cost of 10. The
well is therefore an investment in building a competitive advantage. It is deep to the extent
that the competitive advantage can be sustained for at least some time.
Diagonal trenches. A diagonal trench, as seen in the lower panels of Figure 4, is a price
war between symmetric or nearly symmetric firms. Like a well, a diagonal trench serves
to build a competitive advantage. Unlike a well, however, a diagonal trench also serves to
defend it. A diagonal trench is about acquiring and maintaining a permanent competitive
advantage. Aggressive pricing is not confined to the top of the learning curve. On the
contrary, it takes place all along the diagonal of the state space as each firm uses price cuts
to push the state to “its” side of the diagonal and keep it there. A curious feature of a
diagonal trench is that firms compete fiercely even though they have already exhausted the
gains from learning-by-doing.
We can employ backward-induction-like logic, as illustrated in Figure 10, to gain in-
tuition about the link between organizational forgetting and diagonal trenches. Consider
state (e, e), where e ≥ m, on the diagonal of the state space at or beyond the bottom of
the learning curve. From part (i) of Proposition 3, without organizational forgetting, the
advantage-building and advantage-defending motives disappear and equilibrium prices coin-
cide with prices in the static Nash equilibrium. However, with organizational forgetting, the
advantage-building and advantage-defending motives continue to operate. The advantage-
building motive operates in state (e, e) because by winning a sale, the firm creates a “buffer
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stock” of know-how against future losses from organizational forgetting. The advantage-
defending motive operates because by winning a sale, the firm increases the likelihood that
its rival slides back up its learning curve. Thus, organizational forgetting predisposes firms
to compete fiercely even though they have already exhausted the gains from learning-by-
doing. Table 2 illustrates this point by providing details on firms’ competitive positions in
various states for our leading example of a trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.0275). As
can be seen, the prize in state (21, 21) is 2.14 and justifies charging a price of 5.26 that is
a little below the marginal cost of 5.30 and a lot below the static Nash equilibrium price of
7.30.
Next consider state (e, e− 1) where firm 1 has a slight lead over firm 2 (see Figure 10).
With organizational forgetting, the leader’s prize from winning a sale is likely larger than
the follower’s. In our leading example, the leader’s prize in state (21, 20) is almost 25 times
larger than the follower’s. This indicates that winning a sale is considerably more valuable
to the leader than the follower.
To see why, suppose the follower wins. In this case the follower may leapfrog the leader
if the industry moves to state (e− 1, e), but the odds are against this possibility (by about
3 : 1 in our leading example). The most likely possibility is that the industry moves back
to state (e, e) where there is brutal price competition. In our leading example, such a
move to state (21, 21) happens with a probability of 0.32 and, if so, then the follower’s
expected cash flow in the next period decreases to −0.02 = 0.50 × (5.26 − 5.30) compared
to 0.34 = 0.28× (6.54− 5.30) if the industry were to remain in state (21, 20).
By contrast, if the leader wins, then the industry is guaranteed to not move back to
state (e, e), thereby avoiding the brutal price competition in this state. The leader also, of
course, avoids the possibility of losing its competitive advantage by precluding movements
to states such as (e−1, e) and (e−1, e−1). And the leader may even enhance its competitive
advantage by inducing movements to states such as (e, e−2), (e+1, e−1), and (e+1, e−2).
The most likely possibility is that the industry moves to state (e+ 1, e− 1). In our leading
example, such a move to state (22, 20) happens with a probability of 0.32 and, if so, the
leader’s expected cash flow in the next period increases to 0.87 = 0.76 × (6.44 − 5.30)
compared to 0.20 = 0.72× (5.57− 5.30) if the industry were to remain in state (21, 20).
To the extent that the leader’s prize from winning a sale is larger than the follower’s,
the leader has a large advantage over the follower in terms of virtual marginal cost. Hence,
the leader substantially underprices the follower. As a result the leadership position in state
(e, e− 1) is more secure in the presence of organizational forgetting than in its absence. In
our leading example, the probability that the leader defends its position is 0.79 (compared
to 0.62 in the absence of organizational forgetting).
To complete the induction, consider finally state (e − 1, e − 1) on the diagonal of the
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state space just below state (e, e) (see again Figure 10). Because the leadership position
in state (e, e− 1) is so secure, both firms fight hard to attain it, thereby intensifying price
competition in state (e − 1, e − 1). In our leading example, the prize in state (20, 20) is
2.16 (compared to 2.14 in state (21, 21)) and justifies charging a price of 5.24 (compared to
5.26). These effects cascade through the state space and give rise to diagonal trenches.
By fighting the price war in the diagonal trench the leader is able to acquire and main-
tain a permanent competitive advantage. In our leading example, the modal states of the
limiting distribution are (21, 28) and (28, 21) where both firms are safely beyond the bot-
tom of their learning curve and cost parity obtains. Yet, the leader underprices the follower
(7.63 vs. 7.81) and thus enjoys higher probability of making a sale (0.55 vs. 0.45). The
follower recognizes that to attain a competitive advantage it will have to “cross over” the
diagonal trench. This discouraging prospect weakens the follower’s motivation to improve
its competitive position and, in turn, strengthens the leader’s motivation to preserve or
strengthen its competitive position. What is critical about this price war is that it is a part
of a Markov perfect equilibrium and, as such, is a credible threat the follower cannot ignore.
Interestingly enough, our leading example violates both the upper and the lower bound
on equilibrium prices in Result 4 and Proposition 3, respectively, that obtain in the absence
of organizational forgetting: Whereas both firms price higher in the most likely long-run
industry structure than in the static Nash equilibrium (e.g., in states (21, 28) and (28, 21)),
“in the trench” they price lower (e.g., in states (20, 20) and (21, 21)).25 This illustrates
Results 5 and 6 and, in turn, shows that in the presence of organizational forgetting the
equilibrium may entail lackluster competition in some states as well as price wars in other
states.
In sum, diagonal trenches are self-reinforcing mechanisms that lead to market domi-
nance: if the leadership position is aggressively defended, symmetric firms fight a price war
to attain it. This provide all the more reason to aggressively defend a competitive advantage
because if it is lost and the industry moves back to the diagonal of the state space, then
another price war ensues.
Sideways trenches. A sideways trench, as seen in the lower right panel of Figure 4, is a
price war between very asymmetric firms. It is triggered when the follower starts to move
down its learning curve. Similar to a diagonal trench, a sideways trench is about acquiring
and maintaining a permanent competitive advantage. However, while a diagonal trench is
about fighting an imminent threat, a sideways trench is about fighting a distant threat. Put
informally, a sideways trench is the equilibrium manifestation of former Intel CEO Andy
Grove’s dictum “Only the paranoid survive.” One can think of a sideways trench as an
25Recall that the static Nash equilibrium price is 7.30 is these states.
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leader follower
state cost prize price prob. cost prize price prob.
(26, 1) 5.30 6.43 8.84 0.90 10.00 0.12 11.00 0.10
(26, 2) 5.30 6.21 7.48 0.88 8.50 0.21 9.44 0.12
(26, 3) 5.30 5.16 6.94 0.85 7.73 0.27 8.65 0.15
(26, 4) 5.30 4.28 6.66 0.82 7.23 0.31 8.15 0.18
(26, 5) 5.30 3.70 6.49 0.79 6.86 0.34 7.81 0.21
(26, 6) 5.30 3.36 6.34 0.76 6.57 0.39 7.51 0.24
(26, 7) 5.30 3.04 6.14 0.73 6.34 0.58 7.15 0.27
(26, 8) 5.30 2.33 5.99 0.66 6.14 1.08 6.64 0.34
(26, 9) 5.30 1.17 6.24 0.51 5.97 1.71 6.29 0.49
(26, 10) 5.30 0.16 6.83 0.40 5.83 1.96 6.44 0.60
Table 3: Cost, prize, price, and probability of making a sale. Extra-trenchy equilibrium
(ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.08).
endogenously arising mobility barrier in the sense of Caves & Porter (1977). If the follower
crashes through this mobility barrier—an unlikely event—he moves from being a docile
competitor to being a viable threat. To prevent this from happening, the leader stalls the
follower.
Table 3 provides details on firms’ competitive positions in various states for our leading
example of an extra-trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.08). Recall that the modal state
of the limiting distribution is (26, 1). The sideways trench is evident in the decrease in the
price charged by the leader between states (26, 1) and (26, 8) and the increase between states
(26, 8) and (26, 10). To see how the leader can stall the follower, note that the follower has
little chance of making it down its learning curve as long as the probability of winning a sale
is less than the probability of losing a unit of know-how through organizational forgetting.
Indeed, while D∗2(26, 1) = 0.10 > 0.08 = ∆(1), we have D∗2(26, 2) = 0.12 < 0.15 = ∆(2)
and D∗2(26, 3) = 0.15 < 0.22 = ∆(3). The ability of the leader to stall the follower at the
top of its learning curve is reflected in the large prize in state (26, 1). In state (26, 2) the
prize is almost as large because by winning a sale the leader may move the industry back
to state (26, 1) in the next period. The prize falls in case the follower moves further down
its learning curve because it takes progressively longer for the leader to force the follower
back up its learning curve and because the lower cost of the follower makes it harder for
the leader to do so. In the unlikely event that the follower crashes through the sideways
trench in state (26, 8), the prize of the leader falls sharply. At the same time the prize of
the follower rises sharply because the follower turns from a docile competitor into a viable
threat with an equal or larger share of the market.
Again, sideways trenches are self-reinforcing mechanisms that lead to market dominance:
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ρ 0.95 0.85 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.35 0.15 0.05
δ¯(ρ) 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.71 0.78 0.81 0.88 0.90
Table 4: Critical value δ¯(ρ) for investment stifling.
If organizational forgetting enables the leader to stall the follower in state (e1, e2), then this
creates strong incentives for the leader to cut prices in states like (e1, e2+1) and (e1, e2+2)
in order to deny the follower a sale and force it back up its learning curve. But because
being in states like (e1, e2 + 1) and (e1, e2 + 2) is not especially attractive, the follower has
little reason to cut price in state (e1, e2). This makes it even easier for the leader to stall
the follower.
In sum, the four types of equilibria that we have identified in Section 4 give rise to distinct
yet plausible pricing behaviors and, in turn, industry dynamics as discussed in Section 5.
Rather than impeding it, organizational forgetting facilitates aggressive behavior. In the
absence of organizational forgetting, the equilibria in our computations have always been
flat either without or with well depending on the progress ratio. Moreover, the lower bound
on equilibrium prices in part (i) of Proposition 3 rules out diagonal trenches (and thus
trenchy and extra-trenchy equilibria). Indeed, in the absence of organizational forgetting,
prices are flat once both firms reach the bottom of their learning curves. Similarly, if the
leader but not the follower has reached the bottom of its learning curve, then part (ii) of
Proposition 3 shows that the leader will not be overly aggressive in defending its advantage.
This limits the scope for sideways trenches. In the presence of organizational forgetting,
in contrast, firms may compete fiercely even though they have already exhausted the gains
from learning-by-doing. Generally speaking, organizational forgetting is associated with
“trenchier” equilibria, more aggressive behavior, and more concentrated industries both in
the short run and in the long run.
There is clearly a limit to the enhancement of price-cutting incentives through organiza-
tional forgetting. If the forgetting rate δ is very large, then organizational forgetting stifles
investment in learning-by-doing altogether. In particular, if δ exceeds the critical value δ¯(ρ)
listed in Table 4, then firms cannot expect to make it down their learning curves.26 Hence,
equilibrium prices at the top of the learning curve are close to prices in the static Nash
equilibrium. Even then, however, price competition at the bottom of the learning curve is
extremely intense as both firms seek to reduce the chance of being the first to slide back up
the learning curve.
26We take δ¯(ρ) to be the smallest forgetting rate such that state (1, 1) is the mode of the limiting distrib-
ution.
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6.3 Dominance properties
Traditional intuition suggests that learning-by-doing leads by itself to market dominance
by giving a more experienced firm the ability to profitably underprice its less experienced
rival. This enables the leader to widen its competitive advantage over time, thereby further
enhancing its ability to profitably underprice the follower. Cabral & Riordan (1994) formal-
ize this idea with “two concepts of self-reinforcing market dominance” (p. 1115), increasing
dominance (ID) and increasing increasing dominance (IID). An equilibrium exhibits ID if
p∗(e) < p∗(e[2]) whenever e1 > e2 and IID if p∗(e)− p∗(e[2]) is decreasing in e1. If ID holds,
the leader charges a lower price than the follower and therefore enjoys a higher probability
of making a sale. If IID holds, the gap between the leader’s price and the follower’s price
widens with the length of the lead. Athey & Schmutzler (2001) extend this idea to dynamic
games with deterministic state-to-state transitions. Their notion of weak increasing dom-
inance describes the relationship between players’ states and their actions and coincides
with Cabral & Riordan’s (1994) notion of ID.27
In the absence of organizational forgetting, Cabral & Riordan (1994) show that ID
and IID hold provided that the discount factor β is sufficiently close to 1 (or, alternatively,
sufficiently close to 0). Their main result carries over to our parameterization with β = 11.05 :
Result 7 (i) If organizational forgetting is absent (δ = 0), then IID holds. (ii) Thus, ID
holds.
Even though the equilibrium satisfies ID and IID, it is not clear that the industry is
inevitably progressing towards monopolization. If the price gap is small, then the effect
of ID and IID may be trivial.28 In such a scenario, the leader charges a slightly lower
price than the follower and this gap widens a bit over time. However, with even a modest
degree of horizontal product differentiation, the firms still split sales more or less equally
and thus move down the learning curve in tandem. Consequently, ID and IID may have
no discernible impact on industry structure and dynamics, either in the short run or in the
long run. This is exactly what happens in the absence of organizational forgetting. For
example, the flat equilibrium without well (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0) satisfies IID and thus ID. Yet,
the industry is likely to be a symmetric duopoly at all times. More generally, as Figure
3 shows, in the absence of organizational forgetting asymmetries are modest if they arise
at all. In fact, although ID and IID hold, the maximum expected Herfindahl index is 0.67
27Similar notions of increasing dominance have also been used by Vickers (1986) and Budd, Harris &
Vickers (1993) in dynamic investment games.
28Indeed, Cabral & Riordan (1994) show that p∗(e) → p†(m,m) for all e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2 as β → 1, i.e.,
both firms price as if at the bottom of their learning curves. This suggests that the price gap may be small
for “reasonable” discount factors.
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(attained at ρ = 0.65). Hence, ID and IID are not sufficient for economically meaningful
market dominance.
ID and IID are also not necessary for market dominance. To give an example, the
extra-trenchy equilibrium (ρ = 0.85, δ = 0.08) violates ID and thus IID because the leader
coasts by charging a higher price if it is far ahead of the follower. Yet, the industry is likely
to be a near-monopoly at all times. More generally, while the empirical studies of Argote
et al. (1990), Darr et al. (1995), Benkard (2000), Shafer et al. (2001), and Thompson (2003)
warrant the inclusion of organizational forgetting in a model of learning-by-doing, ID and
IID may fail in its presence:
Result 8 If organizational forgetting is present (δ > 0), then (i) IID may fail and (ii) ID
may fail.
Figure 11 illustrates Result 8 by plotting the share of equilibria that violate IID (upper
panel) and ID (lower panel). As can be seen, all equilibria fail to obey IID unless organi-
zational forgetting or learning-by-doing is very weak. Even violations of ID are extremely
common, especially for forgetting rates δ in the empirically relevant range below 0.1.
Of course, we do not mean to argue that the concepts of ID and IID have no place in
the analysis of industry dynamics. It appears, however, that caution is warranted: Since ID
and IID are neither necessary nor sufficient for economically meaningful market dominance,
making inferences about the evolution of the industry on the basis of ID and IID alone
may be misleading. We therefore suggest that these concepts be augmented by a search
for tell-tale signs of market dominance such as wells and trenches and, perhaps even more
important, by a direct examination of the industry dynamics implied by firms’ pricing
behavior.
6.4 Summary
Table 5 summarizes the broad patterns of pricing behavior and industry dynamics. Ac-
knowledging that the know-how gained through learning-by-doing can be lost through or-
ganizational forgetting is evidently important. Generally speaking, organizational forgetting
is associated with “trenchier” equilibria, more aggressive behavior, and more concentrated
industries both in the short run and in the long run. Moreover, the dominance properties
of firms’ pricing behavior can break down in the presence of organizational forgetting.
The key difference between a model with learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting
and a model with learning-by-doing alone is that in the former a firm can move both forward
to a higher state and backward to a lower state whenever δ ∈ (0, 1). The possibility of bidi-
rectional movements through the state space opens up new strategic possibilities for firms
that work to enhance the advantage-building and advantage-defending motives. By winning
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flat eqbm.
without
well
flat eqbm.
with well
trenchy
eqbm.
extra-
trenchy
eqbm.
leading example ρ = 0.85, ρ = 0.85, ρ = 0.85, ρ = 0.85,
δ = 0 δ = 0.0275 δ = 0.0725 δ = 0.08
preemption battle (well) no yes no no
price war triggered by immi-
nent threat (diagonal trench)
no no yes yes
price war triggered by distant
threat (sideways trench)
no no no yes
short-run market dominance no yes yes yes
long-run market dominance no no yes, yes,
modest extreme
dominance properties yes no, no, no,
mostly mostly mostly
Table 5: Pricing behavior and industry dynamics.
a sale, a firm makes itself less vulnerable to future losses from organizational forgetting, thus
enhancing the advantage-building motive. At the same time, it makes its rival more vulnera-
ble to future losses from organizational forgetting, thus enhancing the advantage-defending
motive. Because these additional benefits (like the benefits from learning-by-doing) are
achieved by winning a sale, organizational forgetting can create strong incentives to cut
prices. Thus, rather than impeding it, organizational forgetting can facilitate aggressive
pricing behavior that manifests itself in wells and trenches.
7 Organizational forgetting and multiple equilibria
While the equilibrium is unique if organizational forgetting is either absent (δ = 0) or certain
(δ = 1), multiple equilibria are common for intermediate forgetting rates. Surprisingly,
these equilibria range from “peaceful coexistence” to “trench warfare.” Consequently, in
addition to the degree of organizational forgetting, the equilibrium by itself is an important
determinant of pricing behavior and industry dynamics.
Why do multiple equilibria arise in our model? To explore this question, think about the
strategic situation faced by firms in setting prices in state e. The value of continued play
to firm n is given by the conditional expectation of its value function, V n1(e) and V n2(e).
Holding the value of continued play fixed, the strategic situation in state e is thus akin to a
static game. If the reaction functions in this game intersect more than once, then multiple
equilibria arise. On the other hand, we say that the model satisfies stagewise uniqueness if
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the reactions functions of the two firms intersect once irrespective of the value of continued
play. This is indeed the case:
Proposition 4 Statewise uniqueness holds.
Note that the proof of Proposition 4 relies on the functional form of demand. This is
reminiscent of the restrictions on demand (e.g., log-concavity) that Caplin & Nalebuff (1991)
set forth to guarantee uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in their analysis of static price-setting
games.
Given that the model satisfies statewise uniqueness, multiple equilibria must arise from
firms’ expectations regarding the value of continued play. To see this, consider again state
e. The intersection of the reaction functions constitutes a Nash equilibrium in prices in a
subgame in which firm n believes that its value of continued play is given by V n1(e) and
V n2(e). If firms have rational expectations, i.e., if the conjectured value of continued play
is actually attained, then these prices constitute an equilibrium of our dynamic stochastic
game. In our model, taking the value of continued play as given, the reaction functions
intersect once because we have statewise uniqueness, but there may be more than one value
of continued play that is consistent with rational expectations. In this sense multiplicity is
rooted in the dynamics of the model.
The key driver of multiplicity is organizational forgetting. Dynamic competition with
learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting is like racing down an upward-moving esca-
lator. Unless a firm makes sales at a rate that exceeds the rate at which it loses know-how
through organizational forgetting, its marginal cost is bound to increase. The inflow of
know-how into the industry is one unit per period whereas in expectation the outflow in
state e is ∆(e1) + ∆(e2). Consider state (e, e), where e ≥ m, on the diagonal of the state
space at or beyond the bottom of the learning curve. If 1 ¿ 2∆(e), then it is impossible
that both firms reach the bottom of their learning curves and remain there. Knowing this,
firms have no choice but to price aggressively. The result is trench warfare as each firm
uses price cuts to push the state to its side of the diagonal and keep it there. If, however,
1À 2∆(e), then it is virtually inevitable that both firms reach the bottom of their learning
curves, and firms may as well price softly. In both cases, the primitives of the model tie
down the equilibrium.
This is no longer the case if 1 ≈ 2∆(e), setting the stage for multiple equilibria as diverse
as peaceful coexistence and trench warfare. If firms believe that they cannot peacefully
coexist at the bottom of their learning curves and that one firm will come to dominate
the market, then both firms will cut their prices in the hope of acquiring a competitive
advantage early on and maintaining it throughout. This naturally leads to trench warfare
and market dominance. If, however, firms believe that they can peacefully coexist at the
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bottom of their learning curves, then neither firm cuts its price. Soft pricing, in turn, ensures
that the anticipated symmetric industry structure actually emerges. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation is reassuring here. Recall that m = 15 and M = 30 in our parameterization
and observe that 1 = 2∆(15) implies δ ≈ 0.05, 1 = 2∆(20) implies δ ≈ 0.03, and 1 =
2∆(30) implies δ ≈ 0.02. This range of forgetting rates for which the inflow of know-how
approximately equals the outflow is indeed where multiplicity prevails (see again Figure 2).
In general, a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in a dynamic stochastic
game with a finite state space is that the model satisfies statewise uniqueness and the move-
ments through the state space are unidirectional. Statewise uniqueness precludes players’
actions from giving rise to multiple equilibria and unidirectional movements preclude their
expectations from doing so. To illustrate, recall that in the game at hand, a firm can never
move backward to a lower state if δ = 0. Hence, once the industry reaches state (M,M),
it remains there forever, so that the value of future play in state (M,M) coincides with
the value of being in this state ad infinitum. In conjunction with statewise uniqueness, this
uniquely determines the value of being in state (M,M). Next consider states (M − 1,M)
and (M,M − 1). The value of future play in states (M − 1,M) and (M,M − 1) depends
on the value of being in state (M,M). Statewise uniqueness ensures that firms’ prices in
states (M − 1,M) and (M,M − 1) as well as the value of being in these states are uniquely
determined. Continuing to work backwards in this fashion establishes that the equilibrium
is unique. If δ = 1, then a firm can never move forward to a higher state and a similar
argument anchored on state (1, 1) establishes uniqueness of equilibrium.29
8 Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss how the model specification and parameterization affect our
results. In the interest of brevity, we confine ourselves to summarizing our robustness
checks; the underlying figures and tables can be found in the Online Appendix.
8.1 Product differentiation
Our baseline parameterization gives rise to a moderate degree of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. In the static Nash equilibrium, the own-price elasticity of demand ranges
between −8.86 in state (1, 15) and −2.13 in state (15, 1) for a progress ratio of ρ = 0.85.
The cross-price elasticity of firm 1’s demand with respect to firm 2’s price is 2.41 in state
(15, 1) and 7.84 in state (1, 15). As σ is decreased from 1 to 0.2, the respective elasticities
become −102.00, −0.00, 0.00, and 55.0. As σ increases from 1 over 2 to 10, the respective
29Proposition 2 provides an example of this type of proof.
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elasticities become −4.38, −1.86, 2.10, and 3.88 in case of σ = 2 and −1.54, −1.24, 1.32,
and 1.45 in case of σ = 10.
In case of weaker product differentiation with σ = 0.2, trenchier equilibria lead to more
asymmetric industry structures. Conversely, in case of stronger product differentiation with
σ = 2, we obtain more symmetric industry structures. With σ = 10, firms hardly compete
any more and sales are split more or less equally between them. Multiple equilibria no longer
arise because firms are essentially monopolists that do not interact strategically with each
other. Finally, a higher degree of horizontal product differentiation makes the market that
a firm has effective access to smaller, so that it becomes easier for organizational forgetting
to stifle investment in learning-by-doing altogether.
8.2 Outside good
We allow the buyer to choose an alternative made from a substitute technology (outside
good 0) instead of purchasing from one of the two firms (inside goods 1 and 2). The
probability that firm n makes a sale becomes
Dn(p) =
exp(v−pnσ )
exp(v0−c0σ ) +
∑2
k=1 exp(
v−pk
σ )
,
where we assume that the outside good is supplied under conditions of perfect competition
with price equal to marginal cost, p0 = c0. As v0−c0 → −∞, D0(p) = 1−
∑2
n=1Dn(p)→ 0
and we revert to the Cabral & Riordan (1994) setting in which the buyer always purchases
from one of the two firms in the industry.
If we set v = 10 and v0 − c0 = 0, then v − c(1) = v0 − c0 and a firm at the top of its
learning curve is on par with the outside good. The share of the outside good is quite small
in general. In the static Nash equilibrium, as the marginal cost of production declines, the
share of the outside good declines from 0.63 in state (1, 1) over 0.33 in state (2, 2) and 0.15
in state (4, 4) to 0.03 in state (15, 15) for a progress ratio of ρ = 0.85. To further increase
the attractiveness of the outside good we set v0 − c0 ∈ {3, 5, 10}. If v0 − c0 = 5, then the
share of the outside good is quite large in general and declines from 1.00 in state (1, 1) over
0.99 in state (2, 2) and 0.93 in state (4, 4) to 0.69 in state (15, 15).
Multiple equilibria continue to arise in the presence of an outside good, although less
frequently as the outside good becomes more attractive. In particular, we no longer have
sunspots for a progress ratio of ρ = 1 because the outside good sufficiently constrains firms’
pricing behavior even with v0−c0 = 0. With v0−c0 = 10 the equilibrium is unique because
almost all consumers choose the outside good, so that the inflow of know-how into the
industry is much smaller than the outflow. Finally, a more attractive outside good de facto
makes the market smaller, so that it becomes easier for organizational forgetting to stifle
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investment in learning-by-doing altogether.
8.3 Choke price
In the absence of organizational forgetting the equilibria in our computations have always
been flat either without or with well depending on the progress ratio. As in Cabral &
Riordan (1994) our logit specification for demand ensures that a firm always has a positive
probability of making a sale and therefore must eventually reach the bottom of its learning
curve. A natural concern is whether this stacks the deck against long-run market dominance
to occur in the absence of organizational forgetting. To explore this issue, we assume that
the probability that firm n makes a sale is given by the linear specification
Dn(p) = min
(
max
(
1
2
− 1
4σ
(pn − p−n), 0
)
, 1
)
.30
Note that due to the choke price in the linear specification, a firm is able to surely deny its
rival a sale by pricing sufficiently aggressively.
For linear demand with σ = 1 our computations show that the industry evolves towards
a symmetric structure in the absence of organizational forgetting (δ = 0). With σ = 0.2, in
contrast, firms at the top of their learning curves fight a preemption battle. The industry
remains in an asymmetric structure as the winning firm takes advantage of the choke price
to stall the losing firm at the top of its learning curve. Yet, we never found a trenchy or
extra-trenchy equilibrium with linear demand in the absence of organizational forgetting.
We are therefore confident that the flat equilibria that arise in the absence of organizational
forgetting are not an artifact of the lack of a choke price with logit demand. At the same
time, we continued to find trenchy and extra-trenchy equilibria with linear demand in the
presence of organizational forgetting. Organizational forgetting has thus the same dramatic
effect on firms’ pricing behavior whether demand is logit or linear.
8.4 Frequency of sales
Following Cabral & Riordan (1994) we take a period to be just long enough for a firm
to make a sale. One might wonder whether the insights of the analysis are sensitive to
this assumption. To explore this issue without fundamentally departing from our modeling
framework, we divide a period into K > 1 subperiods. Assuming that one sale occurs
in a subperiod, K sales occur in a period. If r is the discount rate per period, then rK
is the discount rate per subperiod and β = 11+ r
K
the discount factor. We have to be
careful not to inadvertently change the properties of learning-by-doing and organizational
30To allow for a fair comparison between linear and logit demand, we choose the slope parameter so that
in the static Nash equilibrium the own-price elasticity of demand in state (1, 1) is the same.
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period subperiod flat eqbm.
without well
flat eqbm.
with well
trenchy eqbm. extra-trenchy
eqbm.
8 16 (5, 5) (3, 6.5), (6.5, 3) (3, 6.5), (6.5, 3) (1, 6.5), (6.5, 1)
16 32 (9, 9) (5.5, 10), (10, 5.5) (6, 9.5), (9.5, 6) (1, 10), (10, 1)
32 64 (17, 17) (11.5, 14), (14, 11.5) (11, 14.5), (14.5, 11) (1, 14), (14, 1)
64 128 (30, 30) (19.5, 20), (20, 19.5) (18, 21.5), (21.5, 18) (1, 18), (18, 1)
∞ ∞ (30, 30) (29, 30), (30, 29) (26, 30), (30, 26) (1, 24), (24, 1)
Table 6: Frequency of sales withK = 2. Modal states of transient and limiting distributions.
forgetting by changing the frequency of sales. For example, the reduction in marginal
cost that is achievable by a period’s worth of sales in the original specification has to be
comparable to the reduction that is achievable by K subperiods’ worth of sales in the
alternative specification. To accomplish this, we take the state space to be {1, . . . ,K(M −
1) + 1}2. The marginal cost and probability of forgetting of firm n in the alternative
specification are given by c
(
en−1
K + 1
)
and ∆
(
en−1
K + 1
)
. Finally, we take K(m− 1) + 1 to
be the stock of know-how at which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve.
We have computed equilibria for a progress ratio of ρ = 0.85 while doubling the frequency
of sales by setting K = 2. We obtain a flat equilibrium without well (δ = 0), a flat
equilibrium with well (δ = 0.02), a trenchy equilibrium (δ = 0.02), and an extra-trenchy
equilibrium (δ = 0.09), similar to the four typical cases in Figure 4. Table 6 lists the modal
states of the implied transient and limiting distributions. As can be seen, industry structure
and dynamics are comparable to those in Figures 5–7.31 Overall, it appears that our results
are not sensitive to the frequency of sales.
8.5 Learning-by-doing
Following Cabral & Riordan (1994) we assume that m < M represents the stock of know-
how at which a firm reaches the bottom of its learning curve. To check the robustness
of our results, we instead assume m = M . In this bottomless learning specification, we
obtain another type of equilibrium in addition to the four typical cases in Figure 4. Figure
12 exemplifies the policy function of this plateau equilibrium (upper left panel), the tran-
sient distribution in period 8 and 32 (upper right and lower left panels), and the limiting
distribution (lower right panel). The parameter values are ρ = 0.9 and δ = 0.04.
As can be seen, the plateau equilibrium is similar to a trenchy equilibrium except that
the diagonal trench is interrupted by a region (around state (17, 17)) of very soft price
31With the possible exception of the extra-trenchy equilibrium: While the modal states of the limiting
distribution are (1, 24) and (24, 1) with a probability of 0.0086 each, the limiting distribution also has
secondary peaks at states (5.5, 9.5) and (9.5, 5.5) with a probability of 0.0068 each. That is, there is some
chance that the industry does not become extremely asymmetric as it does in our baseline parameterization
with K = 1.
40
asymmetric symmetric
period state prob. state prob.
8 (2, 7), (7, 2) 0.0782 – –
16 (4, 10), (10, 4) 0.0357 – –
32 (6, 14), (14, 6) 0.0192 – –
64 (8, 20), (20, 8) 0.0143 (15, 15) 0.0017
∞ (11, 25), (25, 11) 0.0111 (17, 17) 0.0072
Table 7: Bottomless learning. Most-likely asymmetric and symmetric states of transient
and limiting distributions. Plateau equilibrium (ρ = 0.9, δ = 0.04).
asymmetric symmetric
period state prob. state prob.
8 – – (4, 5), (5, 4) 0.0803
16 – – (6, 7), (7, 6) 0.0434
32 (4, 17), (17, 4) 0.0007 (10, 10) 0.0312
64 (8, 21), (21, 8) 0.0013 (13, 14), (14, 13) 0.0247
∞ (15, 21), (21, 15) 0.0075 – –
Table 8: Bottomless learning. Most-likely asymmetric and symmetric states of transient
and limiting distributions. Plateau equilibrium (ρ = 0.9, δ = 0.04).
competition. On this plateau both firms charge prices well above cost. This “cooperative”
behavior contrasts markedly with the price war of the diagonal trench. While the most-
likely industry structure is asymmetric in the long run in this example, there is also a
substantial probability that the industry becomes symmetric: The modal states of the
limiting distribution are (11, 25) and (25, 11) with a probability of 0.0111 each. Yet, the
limiting distribution also has a secondary peak at state (17, 17) with a probability of 0.0072.
Table 7 summarizes the dynamics of the industry by providing the most-likely asymmetric
and symmetric states of the transient and limiting distributions. As can be seen, the
likelihood of cooperation goes up with time.
Table 8 provides another example of a plateau equilibrium. The parameter values are
the same (ρ = 0.9 and δ = 0.04), thereby providing another instance of multiplicity. In this
case the most-likely industry structure is symmetric in the short run and asymmetric in the
long run (see the Online Appendix for details). That is, the likelihood of cooperation goes
down with time.
8.6 Organizational forgetting
We take the probability ∆(en) that firm n loses a unit of know-how through organizational
forgetting to be 1 − (1 − δ)en , an increasing and concave function (as long as δ > 0), to
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capture the idea that a firm with more know-how is more vulnerable to organizational
forgetting. We alternatively take ∆(en) to be δ, a constant. This may be appropriate in
situations in which there is a leading edge of know-how which, if not continually applied, is
at risk of being lost.
Our results carry over to this constant forgetting specification. If organizational for-
getting is sufficiently weak, then asymmetries may arise but they cannot persist. If orga-
nizational forgetting is sufficiently strong, then asymmetries cannot arise in the first place
because organizational forgetting stifles investment in learning-by-doing altogether. By con-
trast, for intermediate degrees of organizational forgetting, asymmetries arise and persist.
Multiple equilibria continue to arise in the constant forgetting specification. Multiplicity
is especially pervasive for forgetting rates δ around or somewhat below 0.5. This reaffirms
our notion that the primitives of the model tie down the equilibrium unless the inflow of
know-how into the industry balances the outflow. The latter happens for forgetting rates
around 0.5, and the nature of the equilibrium is therefore governed by firms’ expectations
regarding to value of continued play.
8.7 Entry and exit
So far we have assumed that the industry is composed of a fixed number of firms. It is
straightforward to extend the model to allow for entry and exit. The Online Appendix
formally derives the general model; here, we briefly sketch it.
We assume that at any point in time there is a total of N firms, each of which can be
either an incumbent firm or a potential entrant. Thus, if N∗ is the number of incumbent
firms, N − N∗ is the number of potential entrants. Once an incumbent firm exits the
industry, it perishes and a potential entrant automatically takes its “slot” and has to decide
whether or not to enter the industry. Potential entrants are drawn from a large pool. Hence,
if a potential entrant chooses not to enter the industry in the current period, it disappears
and its slot is given to another potential entrant in the subsequent period. In what follows
we focus on the case of N = 2. Though alternatives are possible, we specify that an entrant
comes into the industry at the top of the learning curve. Since the analysis of entry and
exit requires a well-posed monopoly problem, we include an outside good.
To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we use the approach in Doraszelski & Sat-
terthwaite (2007). In each period, each potential entrant receives a privately observed draw
Sn from a uniform distribution of possible set-up costs with support [3, 6] and each incum-
bent firm receives a privately observed draw Xn from a uniform distribution of possible
salvage values with support [0, 3].32 It is convenient to summarize the entry and exit deci-
32This implies that some portion of set-up costs is sunk, thereby eliminating the possibility that a firm
enters the industry merely because it hopes to draw a salvage value that exceeds its set-up cost.
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sions of firm n using an operating probability λn(e), where e ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}N is the state
of the industry. If en = 0, firm n is a potential entrant and λn(e) is the probability that
it enters the industry in state e; if en 6= 0, firm n is an incumbent firm and λn(e) is the
probability that it remains in the industry. A symmetric and anonymous Markov perfect
equilibrium consists of a value function V ∗(e) = V1(e), a pricing function p∗(e) = p1(e),
and an operating probability λ∗(e) = λ1(e) for firm 1.
Entry and exit do not alter the thrust of our results. Organizational forgetting remains
a source of aggressive pricing behavior. Indeed, allowing for exit adds another component
to the prize from winning a sale because by winning a sale, a firm may move the industry
to a state in which its rival is likely to exit. But if the rival exits, then it may be replaced
by an entrant that comes into the industry at the top of its learning curve or it may not
be replaced at all. As a result, pricing behavior is more aggressive than in the basic model
without entry nor exit. This leads to more pronounced asymmetries both in the short run
and in the long run. It is even possible that the industry is monopolized.
Multiple equilibria continue to arise in the general model. Entry and exit exacerbate
the multiplicity problem. Strikingly, in contrast to Proposition 2, there may be multiple
equilibria even in the absence of organizational forgetting (δ = 0). For a progress ratio
of ρ = 0.75, for example, we found three equilibria. While these equilibria are flat either
without or with well, the implied long-run industry structures range from symmetric (with
the model state of the limiting distribution being (30, 30)) to monopolistic (with the modal
states being (0, 30) and (30, 0)). In the former equilibrium, once both firms have entered the
industry, there may not be exit in the future (we have λ∗(e) = 1.00 for all e ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2).
Knowing this, firms may as well price softly, so that, in turn, the incentive to enter the
industry is strong even if an incumbent must be faced (we have λ∗(0, 1) = 0.84). In the
latter equilibrium, each firm uses price cuts to induce its rival to exit (we have p∗(1, 1) =
−36.95 and λ∗(2, 1) = 1.00 but λ∗(1, 2) = 0.76). Given that post-entry pricing behavior
is “predatory”, the incentive to enter the industry is weak in the first place (we have
λ∗(0, 1) = 0.08), thereby ensuring that the most-likely industry structure is monopolistic not
only in the long run but also in the short run (the modal states of the transient distribution
are (0, 8) and (8, 0) in period 8 and (0, 30) and (30, 0) in period 32).
9 Conclusions
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a
variety of industrial settings. Using the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework of Ericson &
Pakes (1995) this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for
these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics.
43
We enhance the methodological foundations of this literature in two ways. First, we show
that there are equilibria that cannot be computed by the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
Second, we propose a homotopy algorithm that allows us to describe in detail the structure
of the set of equilibria of our dynamic stochastic game.
In contrast to the present paper, the theoretical literature on learning-by-doing has
largely ignored organizational forgetting. Moreover, it has mainly focused on firms’ pricing
behavior. By directly examining industry dynamics, we are able to show that ID and IID
may not be sufficient for economically meaningful market dominance. By generalizing the
existing models of learning-by-doing through the addition of organizational forgetting, we
are able to show that these dominance properties of firms’ pricing behavior break down in
the presence of even a small degree of organizational forgetting. Yet, it is precisely in the
presence of organizational forgetting that market dominance ensues both in the short run
and in the long run.
Our analysis of the role of organizational forgetting reveals that learning-by-doing and
organizational forgetting are distinct economic forces. Organizational forgetting, in partic-
ular, does not simply negate learning-by-doing. The unique role played by organizational
forgetting comes about because it makes bidirectional movements through the state space
possible. Hence, dynamic competition with learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting
is akin to racing down an upward moving escalator. As a consequence, a model with both
learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior,
market dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning-by-doing alone
cannot.
Diagonal and sideways trenches are part and parcel to the self-reinforcing mechanisms
that lead to market dominance. Since the leadership position is aggressively defended, firms
fight a price war to attain it. This provides all the more reason to aggressively defend the
leadership position because if it is lost, then another price war ensues. This seems like a
good story to tell. Our computations show that this is not just an intuitively sensible story
but also a logically consistent one that—perhaps—plays out in real markets.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i): The basic differential equations (12) set
δ′(s) = det
(
∂F(x(s), δ(s))
∂x
)
.
The Jacobian ∂F(x(s),δ(s))∂x is a (2M
2 × 2M2) matrix and therefore has an even number of
eigenvalues. Its determinant is the product of its eigenvalues. Hence, if δ′(s) ≤ 0, then there
exists at least one real nonnegative eigenvalue. (Suppose to the contrary that all eigenvalues
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are either complex or real and negative. Since the number of complex eigenvalues is even,
so is the number of real eigenvalues. Moreover, the product of a conjugate pair of complex
eigenvalues is positive, as is the product of an even number of real negative eigenvalues.)
To relate the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm to our homotopy algorithm, consider
a parametric path (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1 in the equilibrium correspondence. We show in the
Online Appendix that
∂G(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
=
∂F(x(s), δ(s))
∂x
+ I, (18)
where I denotes the (2M2 × 2M2) identity matrix.
The proof is completed by recalling a basic result from linear algebra: Let A be an
arbitrary matrix and σ(A) its spectrum. Then σ(A+ I) = σ(A) + 1 (see Proposition A.17
in Appendix A of Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis 1997). Hence, because ∂F(x(s),δ(s))∂x has at least one
real nonnegative eigenvalue, it follows from equation (18) that ∂G(x(s))∂x
∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
has at least
one real eigenvalue equal to or bigger than unity. Hence, ρ
(
∂G(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
)
≥ 1.
Part (ii): Consider the iteration xk+1 = G˜(xk) = ωG(xk) + (1 − ω)xk, where ω > 0.
Using equation (18) its Jacobian at (x(s), δ(s)) ∈ F−1 is
∂G˜(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
= ω
∂G(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
+ (1− ω)I = ω∂F(x(s), δ(s))
∂x
+ I.
As before it follows that ρ
(
∂G˜(x(s))
∂x
∣∣∣
δ=δ(s)
)
≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We rewrite the Bellman equations and FOCs in state e as
V1 = D1(p1, p2)
(
p1 − c(e1) + β
(
V 11 − V 12
))
+ βV 12, (19)
V2 = D2(p1, p2)
(
p2 − c(e2) + β
(
V 22 − V 21
))
+ βV 21, (20)
0 =
σ
D2(p1, p2)
− (p1 − c(e1) + β (V 11 − V 12)) , (21)
0 =
σ
D1(p1, p2)
− (p2 − c(e2) + β (V 22 − V 21)) , (22)
where, to simplify the notation, Vn is shorthand for Vn(e), V nk for V nk(e), pn for pn(e),
etc. and we use the fact that D1(p1, p2) +D2(p1, p2) = 1.
Case (i): First suppose δ = 0. The proof proceeds in a number of steps. In step 1,
we establish that the equilibrium in state (M,M) is unique. In step 2a, we assume that
there is a unique equilibrium in state (e1 + 1,M), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, and show
that this implies that the equilibrium in state (e1,M) is unique. In step 2b, we assume
that there is a unique equilibrium in state (M, e2 + 1), where e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, and
show that this implies that the equilibrium in state (M, e2) is unique. By induction, steps
1, 2a, and 2b establish uniqueness along the upper edge of the state space. In step 3,
we assume that there is a unique equilibrium in states (e1 + 1, e2) and (e1, e2 + 1), where
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e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1} and e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1}, and show that this implies that the equilibrium
in state (e1, e2) is unique. Hence, uniqueness in state (M−1,M−1) follows from uniqueness
in states (M,M−1) and (M−1,M), uniqueness in state (M−2,M−1) from uniqueness in
states (M − 1,M − 1) and (M − 2,M), etc. Working backwards gives uniqueness in states
(e1,M−1), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1}. This, in turn, gives uniqueness in states (e1,M−2),
where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, etc.
Step 1: Consider state e = (M,M). From the definition of the state-to-state transitions
in Section 2, we have
V 11 = V 12 = V1, V 21 = V 22 = V2.
Imposing these restrictions and solving equations (19) and (20) for V1 and V2, respectively,
yields
V1 =
D1(p1, p2)(p1 − c(e1))
1− β , (23)
V2 =
D2(p1, p2)(p2 − c(e2))
1− β . (24)
Simplifying equations (21) and (22) yields
0 =
σ
D2(p1, p2)
− (p1 − c(e1)) = F1(p1, p2), (25)
0 =
σ
D1(p1, p2)
− (p2 − c(e2)) = F2(p1, p2). (26)
The system of equations (25) and (26) determines equilibrium prices. Once we have estab-
lished that there is a unique solution for p1 and p2, equations (23) and (24) immediately
ascertain that V1 and V2 are unique.
Let p\1(p2) and p
\
2(p1) be defined by
F1(p
\
1(p2), p2) = 0, F2(p1, p
\
2(p1)) = 0
and set F (p1) = p1 − p\1(p\2(p1)). The p1 that solves the system of equations (25) and (26)
is the solution to F (p1) = 0, and this solution is unique provided that F (p1) is strictly
monotone. The implicit function theorem yields
F ′(p1) = 1−
(
−∂F1∂p2
)
∂F1
∂p1
(
−∂F2∂p1
)
∂F2
∂p2
.
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Straightforward differentiation shows that(
−∂F1∂p2
)
∂F1
∂p1
=
−D1(p1,p2)D2(p1,p2)
− 1D2(p1,p2)
= D1(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1),(
−∂F2∂p1
)
∂F2
∂p2
=
−D2(p1,p2)D1(p1,p2)
− 1D1(p1,p2)
= D2(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that F ′(p1) > 0.
Step 2a: Consider state e = (e1,M), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}. We have
V 12 = V1, V 22 = V2.
Imposing these restrictions and solving equations (19) and (20) for V1 and V2, respectively,
yields
V1 =
D1(p1, p2)(p1 − c(e1) + βV 11)
1− βD2(p1, p2) , (27)
V2 =
D2(p1, p2)(p2 − c(e2)− βV 21) + βV 21
1− βD2(p1, p2) . (28)
Substituting equations (27) and (28) into equations (21) and (22) and dividing through by
1−β
1−βD2(p1,p2) and
1
1−βD2(p1,p2) , respectively, yields
0 =
(1− βD2(p1, p2))σ
(1− β)D2(p1, p2) −
(
p1 − c(e1) + βV 11
)
= G1(p1, p2), (29)
0 =
(1− βD2(p1, p2))σ
D1(p1, p2)
− (p2 − c(e2)− β(1− β)V 21) = G2(p1, p2). (30)
The system of equations (29) and (30) determines equilibrium prices as a function of V 11
and V 21. These are given by V1(e1 + 1,M) and V2(e1 + 1,M), respectively, and are unique
by hypothesis. As in step 1, once we have established that there is a unique solution for p1
and p2, equations (27) and (28) immediately ascertain that, in state e = (e1,M), V1 and
V2 are unique.
Proceeding as in step 1, set G(p1) = p1−p\1(p\2(p1)), where p\1(p2) and p\2(p1) are defined
by G1(p
\
1(p2), p2) = 0 and G2(p1, p
\
2(p1)) = 0, respectively. We have to show that G(·) is
strictly monotone. Straightforward differentiation shows that(
−∂G1∂p2
)
∂G1
∂p1
=
− D1(p1,p2)(1−β)D2(p1,p2)
− 1−βD2(p1,p2)(1−β)D2(p1,p2)
=
D1(p1, p2)
1− βD2(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1),(
−∂G2∂p1
)
∂G2
∂p2
=
− (1−β)D2(p1,p2)D1(p1,p2)
−1−βD2(p1,p2)D1(p1,p2)
=
(1− β)D2(p1, p2)
1− βD2(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1).
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It follows that G′(p1) > 0.
Step 2b: Consider state e = (M, e2), where e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}. We have
V 11 = V1, V 21 = V2.
The argument is completely symmetric to the argument in step 2a and therefore omitted.
Step 3: Consider state e = (e1, e2), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} and e2 ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}.
The system of equations (21) and (22) determines equilibrium prices as a function of V 11,
V 12, V 21, and V 22. These are given by V1(e1 + 1, e2), V1(e1, e2 + 1), V2(e1 + 1, e2), and
V2(e1, e2 + 1), respectively, and are unique by hypothesis. As in step 1, once we have
established that there is a unique solution for p1 and p2, equations (19) and (20) immediately
ascertain that, in state e = (e1, e2), V1 and V2 are unique.
Let H1(p1, p2) and H2(p1, p2) denote the RHS of equation (21) and (22), respectively.
Proceeding as in step 1, set H(p1) = p1 − p\1(p\2(p1)), where p\1(p2) and p\2(p1) are defined
by H1(p
\
1(p2), p2) = 0 and H2(p1, p
\
2(p1)) = 0, respectively. We have to show that H(·) is
strictly monotone. Straightforward differentiation shows that(
−∂H1∂p2
)
∂H1
∂p1
=
−D1(p1,p2)D2(p1,p2)
− 1D2(p1,p2)
= D1(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1),(
−∂H2∂p1
)
∂H2
∂p2
=
−D2(p1,p2)D1(p1,p2)
− 1D1(p1,p2)
= D2(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that H ′(p1) > 0.
Case (ii): Next suppose δ = 1. A similar induction argument as in the case of δ = 0
can be used to establish the claim except that in the case of δ = 1 we anchor the argument
in state (1, 1) rather than state (M,M).
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i): Consider the static Nash equilibrium. The FOCs in
state e are
p†1(e) = c(e1) +
σ
1−D1(p†1(e), p†2(e))
, (31)
p†2(e) = c(e2) +
σ
1−D2(p†1(e), p†2(e))
. (32)
Equations (31) and (32) imply p†1(e) > c(e1) and p
†
2(e) > c(e2) and thus in particular
p†(m,m) > c(m). In addition, p†(e) = p†(m,m) because c(e1) = c(e2) = c(m) for all
e ∈ {m, . . . ,M}2.
Turning to our dynamic stochastic game, suppose that δ = 0. The proof of part (i)
proceeds in a number of steps, similar to the proof of Proposition 2. In step 1, we establish
that equilibrium prices in state (M,M) coincide with the static Nash equilibrium. In step
2a, we assume that the equilibrium in state (e1+1,M), where e1 ∈ {m, . . . ,M−1}, coincides
with the equilibrium in state (M,M) and show that this implies that the equilibrium in
state (e1,M) does the same. In step 2b, we assume that the equilibrium in state (M, e2+1),
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where e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1}, coincides with the equilibrium in state (M,M) and show that
this implies that the equilibrium in state (M, e2) does the same. In step 3, we assume
that the equilibrium in states (e1 + 1, e2) and (e1, e2 + 1), where e1 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1} and
e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1}, coincides with the equilibrium in state (M,M) and show that this
implies that the equilibrium in state (e1, e2) does the same. Also similar to the proof of
Proposition 2, we continue to use Vn as shorthand for Vn(e), V nk for V nk(e), pn for pn(e),
etc.
Step 1: Consider state e = (M,M). From the proof of Proposition 2, equilibrium prices
are determined by the system of equations (25) and (26). Since equations (25) and (26)
are equivalent to equations (31) and (32), equilibrium prices are p1 = p
†
1 and p2 = p
†
2.
Substituting equation (25) into (23) and equation (26) into (24) yields equilibrium values
V1 =
σD1(p1, p2)
(1− β)D2(p1, p2) , (33)
V2 =
σD2(p1, p2)
(1− β)D1(p1, p2) . (34)
Step 2a: Consider state e = (e1,M), where e1 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1}. Equilibrium prices
are determined by the system of equations (29) and (30). Given V 11 = V1(e1 + 1,M) =
V1(M,M) and V 21 = V2(e1+1,M) = V2(M,M), it is easy to see that, in state e = (e1,M),
p1 = p1(M,M) and p2 = p2(M,M) are a solution. Substituting equation (29) into (27)
and equation (30) into (28) yields equilibrium values V1 = V1(M,M) and V2 = V2(M,M)
as given by equations (33) and (34).
Step 2b: Consider state e = (M, e2), where e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1}. The argument is
completely symmetric to the argument in step 2a and therefore omitted.
Step 3: Consider state e = (e1, e2), where e1 ∈ {m, . . . ,M−1} and e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M−1}.
Equilibrium prices are determined by the system of equations (21) and (22). Given V 11 =
V1(e1 + 1, e2) = V1(M,M), V 12 = V1(e1, e2 + 1) = V1(M,M), V 21 = V2(e1 + 1, e2) =
V2(M,M), and V 22 = V2(e1, e2+1) = V2(M,M), it is easy to see that, in state e = (e1, e2),
p1 = p1(M,M) and p2 = p2(M,M) are a solution. Substituting equation (21) into (19)
and equation (22) into (20) yields equilibrium values V1 = V1(M,M) and V2 = V2(M,M)
as given by equations (33) and (34).
Part (ii): We show that p2(e) > c(m) for all e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M}.
The claim follows because p∗(e) = p2(e[2]).
The proof of part (ii) proceeds in two steps. In step 1, we establish that the equilibrium
price of firm 2 in state (e1,M), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, exceeds c(m). In step 2, we
assume that the equilibrium in state (e1, e2 + 1), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and e2 ∈
{m, . . . ,M − 1}, coincides with the equilibrium in state (e1,M) and show that this implies
that the equilibrium in state (e1, e2) does the same.
Step 1: Consider state e = (e1,M), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}. From the proof of
Proposition 2, equilibrium prices are determined by the system of equations (29) and (30).
Using the fact that in equilibrium V 21 ≥ 0, equation (30) implies p2 > c(m). Substituting
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equation (29) into (27) and equation (30) into (28) yields equilibrium values
V1 =
σD1(p1, p2)
(1− β)D2(p1, p2) , (35)
V2 =
σD2(p1, p2) + βD1(p1, p2)V 21
D1(p1, p2)
. (36)
Step 2: Consider state e = (e1, e2), where e1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and e2 ∈ {m, . . . ,M − 1}.
Equilibrium prices are determined by the system of equations (21) and (22). Given V 12 =
V1(e1, e2 + 1) = V1(e1,M) and V 22 = V2(e1, e2 + 1) = V2(e1,M), it is easy to see that, in
state e = (e1, e2), p1 = p1(e1,M) and p2 = p2(e1,M) are a solution. Substituting equation
(21) into (19) and equation (22) into (20) yields equilibrium values V1 = V1(e1,M) and
V2 = V2(e1,M) as given by equations (35) and (36).
Proof of Proposition 4. We rewrite the FOCs in state e as
0 =
σ
D2(p1, p2)
− (p1 − c(e1) + β (V 11 − V 12)) , (37)
0 =
σ
D1(p1, p2)
− (p2 − c(e2) + β (V 22 − V 21)) , (38)
where, to simplify the notation, V nk is shorthand for V nk(e), pn for pn(e), etc. and we use
the fact that D1(p1, p2)+D2(p1, p2) = 1. The system of equations (37) and (38) determines
equilibrium prices. We have to establish that there is a unique solution for p1 and p2
irrespective of V 11, V 12, V 21, and V 22.
Let H1(p1, p2) and H2(p1, p2) denote the RHS of equation (37) and (38), respectively.
Proceeding as in step 3 of the proof of Proposition 2, set H(p1) = p1 − p\1(p\2(p1)), where
p\1(p2) and p
\
2(p1) are defined by H1(p
\
1(p2), p2) = 0 and H2(p1, p
\
2(p1)) = 0, respectively.
We have to show that H(·) is strictly monotone. Straightforward differentiation shows that(
−∂H1∂p2
)
∂H1
∂p1
=
−D1(p1,p2)D2(p1,p2)
− 1D2(p1,p2)
= D1(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1),(
−∂H2∂p1
)
∂H2
∂p2
=
−D2(p1,p2)D1(p1,p2)
− 1D1(p1,p2)
= D2(p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that H ′(p1) > 0.
References
Ackerberg, D., Benkard, L., Berry, S. & Pakes, A. (2005), Econometric tools for analyzing
market outcomes, in J. Heckman, ed., ‘Handbook of Econometrics’, Vol. 6, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, p. forthcoming.
Alchian, A. (1963), ‘Reliability of progress curves in airframe production’, Econometrica
31(4), 679–693.
50
Argote, L., Beckman, S. & Epple, D. (1990), ‘The persistence and transfer of learning in an
industrial setting’, Management Science 36(2), 140–154.
Athey, S. & Schmutzler, A. (2001), ‘Investment and market dominance’, Rand Journal of
Economics 32(1), 1–26.
Bailey, C. (1989), ‘Forgetting and the learning curve: A laboratory study’, Management
Science 35(3), 340–352.
Baloff, N. (1971), ‘Extension of the learning curve: Some empirical results’, Operational
Reserach Quarterly 22(4), 329–340.
Benkard, L. (2000), ‘Learning and forgetting: The dynamics of aircraft production’, Amer-
ican Economic Review 90(4), 1034–1054.
Benkard, L. (2004), ‘A dynamic analysis of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft’,
Review of Economic Studies 71(3), 581–611.
Berry, S. & Pakes, A. (2006), ‘The pure characteristics demand model’, International Eco-
nomic Review forthcoming.
Bertsekas, D. & Tsitsiklis, J. (1997), Parallel and distributed computation: Numerical meth-
ods, Athena Scientific, Belmont.
Bohn, R. (1995), ‘Noise and learning in semiconductor manufacturing’,Management Science
41(1), 31–42.
Budd, C., Harris, C. & Vickers, J. (1993), ‘A model of the evolution of duopoly: Does the
asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease?’, Review of Economic Studies
60(3), 543–573.
Cabral, L. & Riordan, M. (1994), ‘The learning curve, market dominance, and predatory
pricing’, Econometrica 62(5), 1115–1140.
Cabral, L. & Riordan, M. (1997), ‘The learning curve, predation, antitrust, and welfare’,
Journal of Industrial Economics 45(2), 155–169.
Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B. (1991), ‘Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence
of equilibrium’, Econometrica 59(1), 26–59.
Caves, R. & Porter, M. (1977), ‘From entry barriers to mobility barriers: Conjectural deci-
sions and contrived deterrence to new competition’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
91(2), 241–261.
Darr, E., Argote, L. & Epple, D. (1995), ‘The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of
knowledge in service organizations: Productivity in franchises’, Management Science
41(11), 1750–1762.
Dasgupta, P. & Stiglitz, J. (1988), ‘Learning-by-doing, market structure and industrial and
trade policies’, Oxford Economics Papers 40(2), 246–268.
51
DeJong, J. (1957), ‘The effects of increasing skills on cycle time and its consequences for
time standards’, Ergonomics 1(1), 51–60.
Demichelis, S. & Germano, F. (2002), ‘On (un)knots and dynamics in games’, Games and
Economic Behavior 41, 46–60.
Doraszelski, U. & Judd, K. (2004), Avoiding the curse of dimensionality in dynamic sto-
chastic games, Technical working paper no. 304, NBER, Cambridge.
Doraszelski, U. & Satterthwaite, M. (2007), Computable Markov-perfect industry dynam-
ics: Existence, purification, and multiplicity, Working paper, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge.
Dudley, L. (1972), ‘Learning and productivity changes in metal products’, American Eco-
nomic Review 62(4), 662–669.
Dutton, J. & Thomas, A. (1984), ‘Treating progress functions as a managerial opportunity’,
Academy of Management Review 9(2), 235–247.
Ericson, R. & Pakes, A. (1995), ‘Markov-perfect industry dynamics: A framework for em-
pirical work’, Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82.
Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1983), ‘Learning-by-doing and market performance’, Bell Jour-
nal of Economics 14(2), 522–530.
Fudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. (1991), Game theory, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Garcia, C. & Zangwill, W. (1979), ‘An approach to homotopy and degree theory’, Mathe-
matics of Operations Reserach 4(4), 390–405.
Ghemawat, P. & Spence, M. (1985), ‘Learning curve spillovers and market performance’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100(Supplement), 839–852.
Gruber, H. (1992), ‘The learning curve in the production of semiconductor memory chips’,
Applied Economics 24, 885–895.
Hatch, N. & Mowery, D. (1998), ‘Process innovation and learning by doing in semiconductor
manufacturing’, Management Science 44(1), 1461–1477.
Herings, J. & Peeters, R. (2004), ‘Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: Structure,
selection, and computation’, Journal of Economic Theory 118, 32–60.
Hirsch, W. (1952), ‘Progress functions of machine tool manufacturing’, Econometrica
20(1), 81–82.
Hirschmann, W. (1964), ‘Profit from the learning curve’, Harvard Business Review
42(1), 125–139.
Irwin, D. & Klenow, P. (1994), ‘Learning-by-doing spillovers in the seminconductor indus-
try’, Journal of Political Economy 102(6), 1200–1227.
52
Jarmin, R. (1994), ‘Learning by doing and competition in the early rayon industry’, Rand
Journal of Economics 25(3), 441–454.
Judd, K. (1998), Numerical methods in economics, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Judd, K. & Schmedders, K. (2004), A computational approach to proving uniqueness in
dynamic games, Working paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford.
Kilbridge, M. (1962), ‘A model of industrial learning’, Management Science 8(4), 516–527.
Levy, F. (1965), ‘Adaptation in the production process’, Management Science 11(6), 136–
154.
Lewis, T. & Yildirim, H. (2002), ‘Managing dynamic competition’, American Economic
Review 92(4), 779–797.
Lewis, T. & Yildirim, H. (2005), ‘Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements
with strategic buyers’, International Economic Review 46(4), 1233–1269.
Lieberman, M. (1984), ‘The learning curve and pricing in the chemical processing industries’,
Rand Journal of Economics 15(2), 213–228.
Pakes, A. (2006), Econometrics and theory in empirical IO, Fisher-Schultz lecture, Harvard
University, Cambridge.
Pakes, A. & McGuire, P. (1994), ‘Computing Markov-perfect Nash equilibria: Numerical
implications of a dynamic differentiated product model’, Rand Journal of Economics
25(4), 555–589.
Pisano, G. (1994), ‘Knowledge, integration, and the locus of learning: An empirical analysis
of process development’, Strategic Management Journal 15, 85–100.
Preston, L. & Keachie, E. (1964), ‘Cost functions and progress functions: An integration’,
American Economic Review 54(2), 100–107.
Ross, D. (1986), ‘Learning to dominate’, Journal of Industrial Economics 34(4), 337–353.
Schmedders, K. (1998), ‘Computing equilibria in the general equilibrium model with in-
complete asset markets’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 1375–1401.
Schmedders, K. (1999), ‘A homotopy algorithm and an index theorem for the general equi-
librium model with incomplete asset markets’, Journal of Mathematical Economics
32(2), 225–241.
Shafer, S., Nembhard, D. & Uzumeri, M. (2001), ‘The effects of worker learning, forgetting,
and heterogeneity on assembly line productivity’, Management Science 47(12), 1639–
1653.
Spence, M. (1981), ‘The learning curve and competition’, Bell Journal of Economics
12(1), 49–70.
53
Thompson, P. (2001), ‘How much did the Liberty shipbuilders learn? new evidence for an
old case study’, Journal of Political Economy 109(1), 103–137.
Thompson, P. (2003), How much did the Liberty shipbuilders forget?, Working paper,
Florida International University, Miami.
Thornton, R. & Thompson, P. (2001), ‘Learning from experience and learning from others:
An exploration of learning and spillovers in wartime shipbuilding’, American Economic
Review 91(5), 1350–1368.
Vickers, J. (1986), ‘The evolution of market structure when there is a sequence of innova-
tions’, Journal of Industrial Economics 35(1), 1–12.
Vives, X. (1999), Oligopoly pricing: Old ideas and new tools, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Watson, L., Billups, S. & Morgan, A. (1987), ‘HOMPACK: A suite of codes for glob-
ally convergent homotopy algorithms’, ACM Transcations on Mathematical Software
13(3), 281–310.
Watson, L., Sosonkina, M., Melville, R. & Morgan, A. (1997), ‘HOMPACK90: A suite of
Fortran 90 codes for globally convergent homotopy algorithms’, ACM Transcations on
Mathematical Software 23(4), 514–549.
Wixted, M. & Ebbesen, E. (1991), ‘On the form of forgetting’, Psychological Science
2(6), 409–415.
Wright, T. (1936), ‘Factors affecting the cost of airplanes’, Journal of Aeronautical Sciences
3(4), 122–128.
Zangwill, W. & Garcia, C. (1981), Pathways to solutions, fixed points, and equilibria, Pren-
tice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Zimmerman, M. (1982), ‘Learning effects and the commercialization of new energy tech-
nologies: The case of nuclear power’, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), 297–310.
54
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
δ
x
A
B
C
D
Figure 1: Homotopy example.
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Figure 2: Number of equilibria.
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.95
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.75
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.85
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.65
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.55
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.15
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.35
0 0.03 0.1 0.3 1
0.5
0.51
0.55
0.7
1
δ
H∞
,
 
H
∧
ρ = 0.05
Figure 3: Limiting expected Herfindahl index H∞ (solid line) and maximum expected
Herfindahl index H∧ (dashed line).
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Figure 4: Policy function p∗(e1, e2). Marginal cost c(e1) (solid line in e2 = 30-plane).
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Figure 5: Transient distribution over states in period 8 given initial state (1, 1).
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Figure 6: Transient distribution over states in period 32 given initial state (1, 1).
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Figure 7: Limiting distribution over states.
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Figure 8: Share of equilibria violating upper bound on equilibrium prices (Result 4).
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Figure 9: Share of equilibria violating lower bound on equilibrium prices (parts (i) and (ii)
of Proposition 3).
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Figure 10: Diagonal trench.
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Figure 11: Share of equilibria violating IID (part (i) of Result 7, upper panel) and share of
equilibria violating ID (part (ii) of Result 7, lower panel).
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Figure 12: Bottomless learning. Policy function p∗(e1, e2). Marginal cost c(e1) (solid line
in e2 = 30-plane) (upper left panel). Transient distribution over states in period 8 and
32 given initial state (1, 1) (upper right and lower left panels). Limiting distribution over
states (lower right panel). Plateau equilibrium (ρ = 0.9, δ = 0.04).
